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Centralized control is a fundamental tenet of joint airpower doctrine, yet there are 
operational situations in which some degree of decentralization may be appropriate.  The 
purpose of this research was to quantitatively assess the impacts of decentralizing the 
command and control (C2) of airpower under varying operational conditions.  The 
research used the experimental method to test hypotheses regarding decentralization of 
control.  JAEX, a stochastic, attrition-based Blue-versus-Red wargaming model, 
generated the required data.   
The mean difference between JAEX outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control constituted the dependent variable for each 
experiment.   The independent variables were the operational condition and the scenario 
complexity.  Three operational conditions were assessed under both an uncontested 
scenario and a contested scenario in which Red was equipped with fighter and surface-to-
air missile defenses.   
The first operational condition increasingly imposed range limitations on Blue 
aircraft, limiting their ability to attack Red targets in other than their assigned sectors.  In 
this experiment, the initial Blue centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 20% to 40% 
depending on scenario complexity, dropped to nil when Blue aircraft were unable to 
 
v 
range all Red target sectors.  Thus, centralized control’s advantage of using Blue aircraft 
to attack the highest-priority Red targets was negated when Blue aircraft could not reach 
targets outside their assigned sector.  
The second operational condition was assessed in two related experiments: one 
that increased the numbers of Blue aircraft, and one that increased their capabilities.  For 
the experiment in which asset numbers were increased, the initial Blue centralized C2 
advantage, ranging from 50% to 60%, dropped to nil when the Blue inventory was 
doubled.  For the experiment in which Blue asset capability was increased, the initial 
Blue centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to 110%, dropped to nil when the 
modeled capability of Blue aircraft was increased from low to high quality.  Thus, the 
advantage provided by centralized control in managing scarce or lower-capability assets 
was negated as the number or quality of Blue assets in each sector was increased.   
The third operational condition increasingly degraded the Blue centralized C2 
node, reducing its ability to coherently execute centralized control.  The initial centralized 
C2 advantage, ranging from 40% to 80%, dropped to -20% (indicating Red advantage) 
when the Blue C2 node was severely degraded.  Thus, the severely degraded Blue 
centralized C2 node generated less effective airpower than the combined airpower 
generated by the three decentralized C2 nodes. 
The results of this research contribute quantitative insights into the relationships 
between the operational conditions of interest and the mean difference between outcomes 
under centralized control and decentralized control.  The results of this study can provide 
input into the myriad factors that commanders consider when designing C2 structures.  In 
addition, the experimental framework can serve as a template for deeper analyses into the 
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topic of decentralizing command and control of airpower.  Finally, the research 
methodology and model could be adapted to provide a tool for professional military 
education, enabling practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of the impacts of 
decentralizing airpower C2.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
“Any large organization faces a basic dilemma between centralization and 
decentralization” (Harford, 2011, p. 80). 
 
The tenet of centralized control, decentralized execution is a fundamental 
principle of the command and control (C2) of joint airpower (Joint Publication 3-30, 
2014a).  Under U.S. doctrine, a joint force is composed of elements from two or more of 
the three military departments: Army, Navy, and Air Force (Joint Publication 3-0, 2017, 
p. GL-11).  The research discussed herein focuses on the control part of this foundational 
tenet, exploring the conditions under which long-range airpower assets can be better 
directed in combat through centralized or decentralized C2 systems.  Accordingly, this 
study examines the operational conditions of geographic distance between target sectors, 
the number and capabilities of air assets, and the capabilities of the C2 systems, in 
assessing the impacts of decentralizing airpower C2. 
This foundational concept of centralized control has been a source of significant 
inter-service debate since the dawn of aviation (Fedorchak, 1995, p. 79; Whitlow, 1994, 
p. 69).  The concept has strong historical roots dating back to the early uses of airpower 
in World War I and is now ensconced in both Air Force service doctrine (U.S. Air Force, 
2015b) and in joint service doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014a) subscribed to by all 
four military services.  Airmen have long argued in favor of centralized control of 
airpower, convinced that this allows commanders to concentrate the limited supply of 
airpower against the highest priority missions.  Airmen tend to associate discussions of 
decentralized control with dividing up airpower capabilities and assigning them to direct 
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support of individual ground combat units.  Such arrangements, derisively termed “penny 
packets” by the Royal Air Force’s Air Marshal Arthur Tedder (1946), are viewed by 
many airmen as suboptimum and wasteful (Rife, 1999, p. 73; Santicola, 2005, p. 4).  This 
research will include discussions of decentralization control arrangements that do not 
carry the negative connotations associated with the direct assignment of airpower assets 
to ground combat units. 
There is a host of trade-offs between the alternatives of centralized control and 
decentralized control (Hinote, 2009).  The tension between the alternatives is at the heart 
of this proposed research; the intent is to analyze how various operational conditions 
affect decentralization’s impact on airpower effectiveness.   
While this study focuses on the military applications of centralized command and 
control, its relevance extends into other military and civilian realms.  Non-military 
applications include balancing the authorities of the federal government versus those of 
the individual states, those of a university versus individual colleges, and those of the 
headquarters of a large corporation versus the regional and local offices, to note only a 
few of many possible additional examples (Morgan, 1993).  Morgan (1997) suggests that 
while highly centralized systems may be appropriate for “firms that are ‘production 
driven’ or ‘efficiency driven,’ they are inappropriate for firms that are ‘market driven’” 
(p. 50).  He notes the “necessity of reconciling the contrary requirements of centralization 
and decentralization to preserve an appropriate flexibility in different parts of large 
organizations” (p. 21).  This study develops a methodology that could be useful in 
assessing tradeoffs between centralization and decentralization in non-military 
organizations.  
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U.S. Airpower Command and Control in Theory  
The appropriate degree of centralization of control has long been a source of 
contention between the various armed services.  Early leaders of the Army Air Forces 
and the British Royal Air Force argued strenuously for central control of airpower by a 
senior airman, while commanders of Army and Navy forces preferred a more 
decentralized approach, in which ground and naval tactical units had control of air 
support (Baltrusaitis, 2004, p. 9-10).  This tension remains, although today the principle 
of centralized control, decentralized execution is generally accepted and is outlined in 
both joint and Air Force doctrine (Joint Publication 3-30; AF Doctrine Annex 3-30).  For 
U.S. joint forces, the Air Operations Center (AOC) is the hub for centralized control of 
joint air operations, serving as the senior element in the Theater Air Control System 
(TACS).  The AOC is responsible for the planning, synchronization, and integration of 
the theater air operation.   
Several military analysts have pointed out, however, that individual and 
institutional interpretations of command and control can vary with time, place, and 
motivation.  The terms themselves can be subject to ambiguous and conflicting 
interpretations.  Despite military doctrine being generally precise in definition of terms 
and concepts, the terms command and control are occasionally used interchangeably in 
doctrine (Ankerstar, 2015, p. 11).  Cooling (1994) notes that  
These terms are so often glibly linked that they are easily assumed to be 
synonymous.  Command is the obligation to make decisions, to give orders, to 
direct.  Control, by contrast, is the process by which command is exercised; this 
involves the whole series of steps by which orders are communicated and the 
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feedback on performance is monitored.  Inexorably this involves the whole 
spectrum of communications, the technical terminology employed, the semantic 
adequacy of the message passed, and the means of communications used.  (p. 
620)   
Alberts and Hayes (2003) provided a useful analogy to explain the difference 
between command and control.  Many homes have a thermostat with which the occupants 
can command a temperature for the heating and air conditioning system to maintain.  The 
thermostat controls the equipment (compressors, heating coils, and air handlers) to attain 
the desired temperature.  In military operations, commands are directives issued by 
authorized personnel; control includes the process and mechanisms for carrying out the 
commands. 
Joint doctrine, the codification of fundamental beliefs gained through experience 
and exercises, includes definitions and descriptions of C2 constructs.  Centralized control 
of joint air operations is defined as placing within one commander the responsibility and 
authority for planning, directing, and coordinating air operations (Joint Publication 3-30, 
2014a, p. GL-6).  Through decentralized execution, the tactical execution authorities are 
delegated to lower-level commanders (such as mission commanders or on-scene 
commanders), who often will have a better comprehension of the tactical execution 
details than those occupants of distant command centers.  Of note, the term decentralized 
control is not defined in doctrine in the context of command and control, but for the 
purposes of this study, decentralization will involve delegating C2 functions to lower-
level commanders rather than being exercised from a centralized control node.   
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According to current joint doctrine, the overall Joint Force Commander (JFC) can 
conduct operations either through service component commanders or through functional 
component commanders (Joint Operations, 2017, p. IV-6).  Figure 1 depicts an 
organizational structure for a joint force commander that includes both service and 
functional component commands. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Possible components in a joint force.  Adapted from Joint Doctrine Publication 
1 (2017), Figure IV-1.  Used with permission. 
 
Should JFCs choose to conduct operations through their service component 
commands, the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Special Operations forces would 
conduct operations under their respective service component commanders, each 
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supporting the overall joint campaign.  As will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, the military services have a history of fighting independently, deconflicting their 
operations rather than integrating them.  For example, during WWII, national military 
commanders geographically deconflicted the Navy’s thrust toward Japan in the Central 
Pacific under Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur’s island-hopping push toward 
Japan in the South West Pacific Area by assigning distinct operational boundaries to 
each.  This scenario provides an example of decentralized air operations using service 
components, in which the naval air forces supporting naval operations and land-based air 
forces under General Kenney supported General MacArthur’s land and amphibious 
forces.  Considerable friction was evident with the two forces operating in close 
proximity to each other (Griffith, 1998, p. 119-121).   
When forces from two or more services operate in the same domain, the JFC can 
conduct operations using functional components (Joint Operations, 2017, p. IV-7).  For 
the function of joint airpower, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) 
exercises control over air forces (from multiple military services and coalition countries) 
assigned or attached to them for tasking, as depicted in Figure 2.  Thus, the JFACC can 
oversee joint employment of Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition aircraft, rather 
than have them operate exclusively in support of their own service components.   
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Figure 2.  Notional Joint Force Air Component Commander authorities.  Adapted from 
“Air Component Command” PowerPoint presentation, 505 Command & Control Wing, 
2017.  Used with permission. 
 
 Although this construct may extract the maximum effectiveness from the 
combined capabilities provided by the services, it also is often a source of friction 
between the services.  Per joint doctrine, the JFACC responsibilities should be assigned 
to the “component commander having the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the 
ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations” (Joint Publication 3-30, 
2014a, p. ix).  Thus, a JFACC, who may be an Air Force officer, can execute joint air 
operations using a combined force consisting of Air Force forces and those from other 
military services and other countries, to provide unity of effort in air operations.   
U.S. Airpower Command and Control in Current Practice 
In practice, the command and control of theater air operations has proven to be a 
complex undertaking, requiring interactions between command nodes and warfighters 
connected by communication links.  Figures 3 and 4 provide a sense of the complexities 
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and the required connectivity with a significant number of entities associated with 
planning, tasking, executing, and assessing joint air operations.  Figure 3 depicts control 
nodes associated with the Theater Air Control System (TACS), the air component’s 
network for planning and executing air operations.  This system comprises a variety of 
components linked together to exercise command and control of airpower.  Under the 
principle of centralized control, the designated JFACC exercises command and control of 
the full spectrum of air operations, including exploitation of space and cyber capabilities, 
from an AOC.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Theater Air Control System depiction.  Adapted from “Air Component 
Command” PowerPoint presentation, 505 Command & Control Wing, 2017, slide 18.  
Used with permission. 
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Figure 4.  Theater Air Ground System (TAGS).  This figure shows the complexity of 
integrating multi-component C2 systems.  Adapted from “Air Component Command” 
PowerPoint presentation, by 505 Command & Control Wing, 2017, slide 18.  Used with 
permission. 
 
 
Per joint doctrine, the AOC is “the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes 
personnel and equipment of necessary disciplines to ensure the effective planning and 
conduct of component air and space operations (e.g., communications, operations, ISR)” 
(Joint Publication 3-30, 2014a, p. II-8).  The typical AOC comprises a support staff and 
five interconnected divisions:  
 Strategy Division 
 Combat Plans Division 
 Combat Operations Division 
 Air Mobility Division 
 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division 
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The AOC is the senior C2 element in the Theater Air Control System depicted in 
Figure 3.  For a detailed discussion of how a large-scale AOC operates in practice, see, 
for example, Lambeth (2013, pp. 207-220), which describes the operation of the CAOC 
located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, prior to and during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.  Subordinate, distributed Air Force-provided control nodes may 
include one or more Control and Reporting Centers (CRC), Air Support Operations 
Centers (ASOC), Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), Joint Surveillance 
Target Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS), and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP), which 
are generally focused on execution rather than planning.  The Control and Reporting 
Centers manage the airspace and coordinate intercepts of unknown and hostile aircraft; 
the AWACS is essentially an airborne version of the CRC.  The JSTARS carries a radar 
sensor that can track moving vehicles and can perform airborne C2 functions.  The 
ASOC operates in conjunction with ground forces, coordinating Close Air Support attack 
missions and other air support.  The TACPs operate alongside ground forces, providing 
close and detailed integration of air support when required by the ground commander.   
The preceding discussion describes the C2 structure erected by the Air Force 
component; each military service brings its own C2 and communications architecture to 
the operating area.  The combined architecture is referred to as the Theater Air Ground 
System (TAGS), depicted in Figure 4.  Each military service’s network is optimized to 
enable it to effectively command and control its own air assets (also known as organic 
assets) to support its assigned missions in the joint battlespace, which is a three-
dimensional version of the traditional two-dimensional battlefield.   
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The Joint Force Air Component Commander’s AOC, responsible for planning, 
tasking, executing, and assessing theater air operations, must be able to effectively 
integrate each of these individual systems.  This effective integration of these systems 
requires extensive information technology and communications requirements, creating 
both advantages for U.S. forces but also potential vulnerabilities, as will be discussed 
subsequently.  The overall joint force commander (JFC), for whom the JFACC works, 
may assign the JFACC the missions of air superiority, strategic attack, theater airlift, 
coordination of combat search and rescue, interdiction, close air support, airspace control, 
area air defense, and integration of space capabilities.  
For Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the overall commander, General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf, designated the Air Force component commander, then-Lieutenant 
General Charles Horner, to be the Joint Force Air Component Commander (Clancy & 
Horner, 1999).  Horner planned, tasked, and executed air operations with his Air Force 
forces, plus air assets provided by other services and coalition partners (Olsen, 2010, p. 
197).  Some tension remained, however, as various air assets remained under control of 
their respective component commanders to meet their own requirements (Gordon & 
Trainor, 1995, p. 310-31).  For example, the Army component retained control of its 
attack helicopters and transport aircraft, the Navy retained aircraft for transport and 
defense of its fleet, and the Marines retained control of much of its ground attack and air 
mobility fleet.  As Winnefeld and Johnson (1993) noted, sufficient resources from the 
services were committed to Desert Storm to allow planners to avoid making fundamental 
choices, and “resolution of the argument has been postponed to another day when 
scarcity, not abundance, will define the rules of the game” (p. 133).  
      12 
 
Airpower advocates have historically expressed resistance to decentralized 
control, concerned that assigning air assets to subordinate commanders, each with their 
narrow view of the overall problem posed by the adversary, will sub-optimize airpower’s 
effectiveness (Santicola, 2005, p. 4).  After all, a lower-level commander faced with a 
difficult mission is unlikely to voluntarily yield air assets to a neighboring commander 
facing a greater threat, even if doing so would be to the benefit of the overall 
organization.  With centralized control, the pooled assets can be apportioned to the 
greatest need, as determined by the overall joint force commander.  Yet many 
commanders of ground or naval forces see centralization of airpower under control of a 
single airman as inhibiting responsiveness to their needs.  As Fedorchak (1995) noted, 
The sea and ground services want airpower to operate under their control in direct 
support of the tactical and operational levels of their respective campaigns, while 
the Air Force wants to focus its assets on an independent air campaign against 
strategic targets in support of the theater campaign.  (p. 79) 
Although naval aviation can perform many of the same functions as the platforms 
in the Air Force, the Navy’s air arm is generally focused on supporting its assigned 
missions by conducting five maritime-related functions: all-domain access, deterrence, 
sea control, power projection, and maritime security (U.S. Navy, 2015b, p. 19).  In 
contrast to the Air Force fundamental C2 tenet of centralized control, the Navy has long 
had a culture of operational freedom.  For most of its history, naval fleets operated under 
a philosophy of decentralized command out of necessity due to inability to communicate 
with ships once they had disappeared over the horizon (Donnithorne, 2018, p. 50).  Navy 
doctrine specifies that “senior maritime commanders still exercise decentralized 
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command, albeit using a much-enhanced awareness of the operational environment” 
(U.S. Navy, 2010, p. 1-2). 
The Marine Corps also poses a dilemma for airpower centralization, as their 
effectiveness relies on seamless integration of land and air combat capabilities.  When 
deployed for operations, leaders of Marine Corps forces insist on operating as an integral 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) (Becker, 1988).  The issue of control of 
Marine aviation during sustained operations ashore has arisen on a regular basis since the 
advent of airpower (Murrow & Bray, 1990, p. iii).  The Marines argue that they lack the 
organic firepower of Army units (particularly artillery and heavy tanks) and rely heavily 
on their air arm (including FA-18, AV-8, and now F-35B and C aircraft) for dedicated 
support of their ground units.  
Similarly, special operations forces (SOF), operating as a Joint Special Operations 
Task Force (JSOTF), are comprised as a cohesive joint team, generally with specialized 
equipment and training.  The Special Operations component operates its air assets under 
its own Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) (Joint Publication 3-05, 
2014b, p. III-10).  Special operations air forces have had, at times, a contentious 
relationship with conventional air forces, even having been described as “dedicated and 
capable warriors who don't work well with others” (Schenberger, 2001, p. 3).  Special 
Operations air commanders generally retain control of their dedicated air assets 
(including gunships, specialized ISR platforms, specially equipped transports, and air 
refueling aircraft) rather than participate in a joint pool of airpower.  The rationale for this 
decentralized approach to airpower centers on their requirement for air-ground teaming, 
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the importance of personal relationships, and the need for secrecy due to the sensitive 
nature of special operations forces activities (Haberichter, 2004, pp. 27-30). 
Despite these caveats, the concept of centralized control of airpower, executed by 
the JFACC, has proven to be effective in recent operations in coordinating modern air 
operations while mitigating the concerns of other services and special operations forces.  
In the past three decades, the air forces of the U.S. and its allies have conducted centrally-
controlled air operations that successfully achieved the objectives set for them in Desert 
Storm (Iraq, 1992), Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 
2001), Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003) and Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) (Brown, 2013; 
Fought, 2004; Lambeth, 2001; Lambeth 2005; Lambeth 2013; Laslie, 2015; Phinney, 
2014).  Yet past performance is not a guarantee of future success, and there are reasons to 
worry about the resiliency of the centralized airpower command and control arrangement 
in future conflicts.   
Resiliency Challenges 
The operations mentioned previously were centrally controlled from CAOCs 
located in relatively low-threat areas.  As noted in the Air Force’s own doctrine, “our 
combat experience of the last two decades has been characterized by centralization of 
authority at the highest possible level in an essentially benign, uncontested air 
environment.”  This statement is followed by a warning of the potential for being lulled 
into complacency regarding relying on secure, unchallenged C2 (Annex 3-30, 2015, p. 4).   
In none of the earlier conflicts was the adversary capable of effectively disrupting 
the JFACC’s C2 apparatus; in future conflicts, however, U.S. air commanders are likely 
to see their C2 capabilities degraded by capable adversaries (Hostage & Broadwell, 
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2014).  U.S. forces have grown accustomed to operating from C2 safe havens, with 
unfettered access to communications networks.  Future conflicts may not provide the 
luxury of unopposed C2.  An attack on the central decision-making node could debilitate 
the planning, tasking, execution, and assessment cycle upon which effective airpower 
employment relies (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014, p. III-20).  Sophisticated adversaries, 
having read U.S. public doctrine and witnessed the capabilities delivered by highly 
integrated, centrally controlled air operations, can be expected to attack the C2 structure, 
just as the U.S. and its allies effectively attacked C2 structures of its adversaries in recent 
conflicts, including Syria (Kaplan, 2016) and Iraq  (Lambeth 2013).  Future adversaries 
will recognize the potential Achilles’ heel associated with placing a significant degree of 
C2 capability in a single node and will likely devote considerable effort to destroying or 
disrupting friendly C2 networks (see, for example, Liang & Xiangsui, 1999).   
The advantages provided by centrally planning, synchronizing, and integrating the 
air effort could become a liability if the central node is incapacitated.  Hostage and 
Broadwell (2014) state, “the resiliency of our networks, datalinks, and communications 
will almost certainly be contested” (p. 38).  Determined and capable adversaries would 
actively work to counter the asymmetric advantage provided by our use of a robust 
interconnected network, through C2 warfare.  C2 warfare is about “cutting off an enemy 
force from its commander, key decision makers, or automated control systems through 
attacking vulnerable control mechanisms” (McGrath, 2017, p. 18).  CAOCs of the future 
may come under physical attack, or adversaries could use attacks through cyberspace or 
the electromagnetic spectrum to disrupt the centralized C2 mechanism.   
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Significance of the Study 
The study is intended to provide quantitative insights into the impacts of 
decentralizing C2 under three different operational conditions: range limitations on Blue 
assets, increasing the quantity or capability of Blue assets, or a reduction in Blue 
centralized C2 capability.  The study presumed a two-sided Blue (friendly forces) versus 
Red (adversary forces) conflict.  Each operational condition was analyzed under two 
scenarios of increasing complexity.   
In general, the degree of decentralization of airpower C2 is driven by the overall 
commander’s assessment of the most effective way to employ joint forces (Joint 
Publication 1, 2017, Chapter V).  However, some degree of decentralization could be 
forced by the effects of C2 warfare, in which attacks on C2 nodes could reduce the 
ability of the centralized nodes to effectively orchestrate operations.  The degree of 
centralization of airpower command and control has significant operational 
consequences, yet, as Kometer (2007) notes, there is relatively little research on the 
topic in the scholarly literature (p. 7).  The results of this study will provide quantitative 
insights into considerations regarding centralization and decentralization of airpower C2 
in future conflicts.   
The joint force commander, with input from the staff and subordinate 
commanders, implements an appropriate airpower command and control structure from 
a menu of options (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014, p. ix).  Control of airpower assets could 
be at the theater level, at the joint task force level, at the service component level, 
through empowerment of lower-level commanders, or some combination of the above.  
For example, as will be discussed subsequently, in 2001, the Central Command 
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leadership initially elected to retain a theater-level air component rather than provide 
separate, decentralized air components for commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This 
arrangement evolved over time, with some elements of control eventually decentralized 
below the theater level (Hukill et al., 2012).   
This study is intended to add to the body of knowledge that commanders rely on, 
augmented by personal experience and understanding of the situation, when determining 
appropriate airpower C2 arrangements.  As described below, the present research 
employs three Blue sectors, with a single Blue base in each sector, and a specific 
inventory of assets, to provide a baseline of results and demonstrate the feasibility of the 
methodology.  However, the methodology and results would be generalizable across 
different number of sectors, different inventory of assets, and different target sets.  Each 
Blue base is representative of a cluster of bases, and each Red target is representative of a 
larger target array.  An example of applying this methodology to a larger, more complex 
scenario is discussed in Chapter V. 
The results of this study will provide input into the many factors that commanders 
consider when designing C2 structures.  Such structures invariably involve decisions 
regarding the appropriate level of centralization, which may be different for different 
types of missions or assets.  In addition, the methodology used in this research, in which 
outcomes under centralized control are contrasted with outcomes under decentralized 
control for the same starting conditions, can provide a framework for further assessments 
of the impact of decentralizing airpower C2.  
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Statement of the Problem 
This research addresses the problem of quantitatively assessing the impacts of 
decentralizing airpower C2 while changing three specific operational conditions: 
imposing Blue air asset range limits, increasing the number or capability of Blue assets, 
and degrading the Blue centralized C2 node’s capability to orchestrate operations.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, the literature is replete with assertions both in support of 
centralized control of airpower’s limited supply or in support of decentralizing control to 
the edge of the battlespace.  The decision to centralize or decentralize various aspects of 
the C2 apparatus of the joint force in an operation would generally be made by the 
commanders involved, but it could be impacted through the adversary’s employment of 
C2 warfare.  This study will attempt to quantify the impact on airpower’s effectiveness of 
decentralizing control, under the operational conditions mentioned above.   
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of 
decentralizing the command and control of airpower while varying these three 
operational conditions: 
 Range limitations on Blue air assets that restrict their capability to operate 
across all geographic sectors (equivalently, increasing the distance between 
sectors of operations).   
 The quantity or capability of Blue assets available for tasking.  
 The capability of the Blue centralized C2 node to effectively control air 
operations. 
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For the purposes of the experiment, the Blue centralized C2 node, representing the 
AOC, could control assets from any of the airfields and strike any of the depicted Red 
targets (including airfields, interdiction targets, and strategic attack targets).  In a 
decentralized mode, the three decentralized C2 nodes could only control strike assets 
based in their respective sector and could only strike targets in the same sector on the Red 
side.  In all cases, the Red side used decentralized control (the Red air assets could only 
be used in the sector in which they were based). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Notional Blue vs. Red battlespace.  This diagram formed the basis for how the 
study compared centralized and decentralized control as the operational conditions were 
varied under two scenarios of different complexity.  
 
 
 
The first operational condition imposed range restrictions on Blue airpower assets 
that limit their geographic area of influence.  This range limitation reduced the ability of 
the centralized node to direct assets from one region to another, even if another sector’s 
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targets were of higher priority.  Inversely, if the geographic distance between sectors 
were reduced (or the aircraft ranges were extended through use of longer-range assets, 
aerial refueling, or intermediate staging locations), centralization should yield increased 
effectiveness, since assets in one sector can be used to meet higher-priority needs across 
the entire battlespace. 
Under the second operational condition, which was divided into two analyses, the 
quantity and capability of the Blue asset inventory was increased.  As the overall quantity 
or capability of Blue assets increases, each sector should become more self-sufficient.  
Thus, it might be expected that the efficiencies exerted by centralization would diminish 
as the total number of assets increases.  Inversely, if the number or capabilities of assets 
were decreased, each asset is in greater demand, and centralized C2 would be expected to 
better facilitate matching these limited assets against the highest priority needs.  Although 
increasing the number of assets was expected to have roughly the same effect as 
increasing their capability while holding the number constant, both conditions were 
subject to experimentation. 
Under the third operational condition, the centralized C2 node experienced a 
capability degradation, affecting its ability to effectively orchestrate air operations across 
the theater.  During a conflict, a fully functional AOC could have its ability to conduct air 
operations severely impacted, at least temporarily, as a consequence of C2 warfare 
(Freedberg, 2017).  The net effect of reducing the centralized node’s capacity would be to 
make the decentralized nodes more effective relative to the debilitated centralized node.  
Since each component commander brings the capability to command and control the 
forces over which he or she exerts operational command (Joint Publication 3-0, 2017, p. 
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IV-7), their decentralized C2 nodes will have significant capability to orchestrate 
operations within a limited sector (for example, SOF, Marine, or naval fleet C2).  The 
research study assessed the impact of decentralization when the centralized node was 
operating at a reduced capacity while the decentralized nodes retained full capability.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
From the preceding discussion, the key research question arises: from a baseline 
of centralized C2, what is the impact on airpower effectiveness when airpower C2 is 
decentralized, and how is this difference between the two types of C2 impacted by 
changes in one of three operational conditions: the geographic range of Blue assets, the 
quantity or capability of Blue assets, or the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node?  
Each of the operational conditions generated a specific research question, discussed 
below.   
Geographic range of assets.  The first specific research question addressed is: 
what is the effect on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control when a greater proportion of Blue assets is range-
limited (i.e., restricted to the geographic sector in which they are based)?  This condition 
can arise as a result of the type of asset employed, as some aircraft, depending on their 
airspeed limits or fuel capacity, are impractical to operate at long ranges.  This condition 
can also arise as a result of long distances between operational sectors, since at some 
point the neighboring sectors will be beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft.  In either 
case, this situation has the effect of limiting the ability of the centralized C2 system to 
shift the air effort to other sectors; the first hypothesis of this study is that the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
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control will decrease as a greater proportion of its assets is range-restricted.  In the 
extreme, if no assets can operate outside the sector in which they are based, there should 
be minimal difference between airpower effectiveness under centralized and 
decentralized control.  The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis are: 
H1:  As the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector 
decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreases.   
H10:  As the proportion of assets that can operate outside their assigned sector 
decreases, there is no significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under 
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control. 
Overall quantity and capability of assets.  The second specific research 
question to be addressed is divided into two subparts:  
Quantity of Blue assets.  What is the effect on mean difference between outcomes 
under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the quantity of 
Blue assets is increased?  The associated hypothesis is that increasing Blue’s quantity of 
assets can offset the impact of decentralizing command and control.  In other words, as 
the quantity or capability of Blue assets increases, any efficiency advantage of 
centralization could be reduced.  The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis 
are: 
H2a: As the quantity of Blue assets is increased, the mean difference between 
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases. 
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H2a0: As the quantity of Blue assets is increased, there is no significant change in 
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control. 
Capability of Blue assets.  What is the effect on the mean difference between 
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the 
capability of Blue assets is increased?  The associated hypothesis is that increasing Blue’s 
asset capability can offset the impact of decentralizing command and control.  In other 
words, as the capability of Blue assets increases, the efficiency advantage of 
centralization could be reduced.  The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis 
are: 
H2b: As the capability of Blue assets is increased, the mean difference between 
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases. 
H2b0: As the capability of Blue assets is increased, there is no significant change 
in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control. 
Degradation of the centralized C2 node.  The third specific research question to 
be addressed is: what is the effect on the mean difference between outcomes under 
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control when the Blue centralized 
C2 node becomes degraded, either by adversary action or natural causes?  The associated 
hypothesis is that degradations in Blue’s centralized C2 capability will neutralize 
advantages it may initially demonstrate compared to a decentralized mode of command 
and control.   
The associated alternate hypothesis and null hypothesis are: 
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H3:  As the Blue centralized node becomes increasingly degraded, the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control decreases. 
H30:  As the centralized node becomes increasingly degraded, there is no 
significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
and outcomes under decentralized control. 
Research Approach 
The research used the experimental method to test the previously outlined 
hypotheses regarding decentralization of control.  A wargaming model known as Joint 
Air Exercise (JAEX) generated the data required for the analysis.  JAEX is a stochastic, 
hexagon-based, operational-level wargame that runs on networked personal computers.  
JAEX is currently being employed for studies sponsored by the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research, and the model is used in educational modules at the Air Command 
and Staff College (Tiller, 2017a, p. 1).  The model’s engine is also used in Modern 
Airpower, adapted for use by the Air Force’s Squadron Officer School as an educational 
tool for company-grade officers (Caffrey, 2019, p. 310).  The JAEX model engine has 
been used in several previously published studies, including Tiller (2017a and 2017b); 
House, Tiller, and Rushing (2016); Tiller and Cavagnaro (2015); and Rushing, Tanner,  
and Tiller, (2015).  The model’s engine is the same used in several popular commercial 
wargames, including War Over the Mideast and War Over Vietnam (Tiller, 2019).  JAEX 
is described further at Appendix A. 
Using the stochastic JAEX model, an air operation plan can be executed hundreds 
of times to obtain a distribution of results for that scenario.  For the present research, the 
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experiments were conducted under Blue centralized control and then under decentralized 
control; the resulting mean outcome difference constituted the dependent variable in the 
experiment.  The outcome differences were compared as the independent variables, the 
operational conditions and scenario complexities, were varied.  The specifics of these 
comparisons are described in more detail in Chapter III of the study.   
Models and Wargames 
 This study employed a computerized wargame model to generate data for 
analysis.  Computer models are mathematical representations of reality, while simulations 
are representations of reality over time (Caffrey, 2000, p. 34).  Wargames are simulations 
of military operations involving opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures 
designed to replicate a real-life situation; wargames are doctrinally described as 
“representations of conflict in a synthetic environment” (Joint Publication 5-0, 2017b,   
p. V-31).   
Some military professionals have expressed unease when their tradecraft is 
subjected to numerical analysis; Clausewitz (in Paret’s 1976 translation) argued that 
knowledge about warfare “cannot be forcibly produced by an apparatus of scientific 
formulas and mechanics” (p. 146).  He flatly stated that “it is not possible to construct a 
model of the art of war…” (p. 140).  The noted strategist Julian Corbett (1911) observed 
in the introduction of his classic book on maritime strategy,  
The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common 
sense, of rapid decision upon complex and ever-shifting factors, and those factors 
themselves are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and 
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physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true 
scientific analysis.  (p. 1)   
Yet not all military strategists are in agreement with Clausewitz and Corbett 
regarding the utility of using models for analysis.  The famed strategist Jomini argued in 
the early 19th century that “all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles” 
(Shy, 1986, 146).  More recently the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense noted that 
“wargames can make the difference between wise and unwise investment trajectories and 
make our forces more successful in future conflicts” (p. 12).  This research is based on 
the premise that wargames can provide useful insights, if not precise answers.  Past 
wargames have proven successful in testing the types of hypotheses analyzed in this 
research, regarding distances, numbers, and capabilities (Caffrey, 2019, pp. 277-289). 
Wargames generally involve opposition driven by a thinking enemy and can 
range from very simple table-top simulations to very complex computerized replications 
of operational environments.  Wargaming has long been recognized as an important 
technique in planning, professional education, and research.  Research using wargames 
can involve both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Hämäläinen, Sormunen, 
Rantapelkonen, & Nikkarila, 2014).  In both wargames and war, chance plays a role.  
Each play of a wargame represents one pass through a series of probabilistic events.  
Computerized wargames allow multiple plays much faster than real time, enabling the 
construction of a histogram of outcomes, as shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.  Notional histogram of outcomes.  This figure reflects normally distributed 
outcomes from a wargaming model.  From Caffrey (2008), slide 32.  Used with 
permission. 
 
   
As Caffrey (2008) noted, conflicts also have many possible outcomes, with the 
actual outcome of a conflict drawn from this distribution of possible outcomes.  In both 
wargames and war, chance plays a role.  Unlike wargames, actual conflicts are not re-
fought multiple times, but if they were, Caffrey argued the distribution of outcomes 
would likely be comparable to the distribution of wargame outcomes, as shown in Figure 
7.  The histogram of wargame outcomes in Figure 7 is depicted as being offset from the 
histogram of outcomes that would be obtained by re-fighting a conflict repeatedly.  This 
study proceeds on the assumption, supported by Caffrey (interview, October 10, 2018), 
that the relative differences in outcomes using a wargame model evaluated under two 
different conditions can provide insights into the relative differences that would be 
obtained in the real world when fought under the same conditions.  
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Figure 7.  Comparison of notional histograms.  If same conflict were to be replicated 
(with each outcome independent of the others), the distribution would conceivably be 
normally distributed, as is the distribution of the wargame results.  The two distributions, 
however, may not center on the same mean nor have the same variance.  From Caffrey 
(2008), slide 37.  Used with permission. 
 
Delimitations 
Because of the complexity of modeling theater air operations, the study sets 
several delimitations to keep the scope of the study at a manageable level.  A theater air 
component commander would orchestrate the planning, tasking, execution, and 
assessment of a wide range of multi-domain operations (Saltzman, 2018; see also Harris, 
2018).  To keep the number of variables manageable, this study will be limited to 
examining the effect of decentralizing control on a pertinent subset of these missions. 
The study restricts itself to analysis of airpower operations associated with strikes 
against fixed targets in the adversary’s rear area.  This mission set has been a key area of 
historic tension between centralization and decentralization of airpower C2 in past 
conflicts, including World War II (Atkinson, 2002; Momyer, 1994), the Vietnam War 
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(Michel, 2002; Momyer 1994; Tilford 1991), the Korean War (Momyer), the first Gulf 
War (Clancy, 1999), and the most recent conflict in Iraq (Lambeth, 2013).   
The menu below depicts the full spectrum of multi-domain missions overseen at a 
typical CAOC.  The present research focuses on a subset of these missions, generally 
corresponding to Clodfelter’s (1989) categorization of direct, independent airpower: 
those missions that involve the lethal application of force intended to achieve objectives 
apart from those pursued by ground or naval forces at a particular location (p. 213).  The 
types of missions studied in the present research are highlighted in bold.   
 Defensive Counterair, including combat air patrols and surface-to-air 
missile operations 
 Offensive Counterair, including attacks on adversary airfields, fighter 
sweeps, fighter escorts, suppression of enemy air defenses, and attacks 
on adversary C2 links and nodes 
 Air mobility operations, including intra-theater and inter-theater 
movement of personnel and cargo), aerial refueling, and aeromedical 
evacuation 
 Oversight of the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, and execution of 
Combat Search and Rescue operations 
 Collection operations management of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions 
 Land attack operations, including Close Air Support, Interdiction, and 
Strategic Attack missions 
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 Space Operations, including defensive measure to protect access to space, 
and offensive actions to impede adversary use of space 
 Cyber Operations, including offensive and defensive cyber measures 
Typically, wargames have active human players in the roles of Blue and Red 
forces.  While using the human players adds an element of realism, it also introduces 
confounding variables; another key delimitation of this study is that actions on each side 
were guided by the model’s algorithms rather than active human play, discussed further 
in the assumptions section, below. 
Another delimitation of the study was that the cost of the various decentralized C2 
options is not included as a measure of efficiency or effectiveness.  C2 nodes require 
equipment and trained personnel, both of which impose costs on military forces.  The 
incremental cost of the decentralized C2 options would be highly dependent on the 
circumstances, since many of the decentralized C2 capabilities are currently inherent in 
component-level operations.  For example, SOF, Marine, and naval forces already bring 
their own C2 apparatus to the theater of operations, so there would be minimal 
incremental resources required.  Another decentralization option would be for the air 
component commander to use the operations centers of deployed combat wings as 
decentralized C2 nodes.  These wing operations centers (WOCs) are normally staffed 
only to conduct the logistics and operational execution activities needed to launch and 
recover the wing's own aircraft to meet assigned taskings and do not exercise control of 
ongoing operations.  To serve as a decentralized C2 node, the WOCs would have to 
expand their limited complements of planning and control personnel and their 
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communications and data linkages.  This study is not intended to identify a preferred 
decentralized mode and will not include costs of decentralized C2 modes in the analysis.   
Limitations and Assumptions 
Wargames are valuable in generating questions to be asked but should not to be 
taken as the absolute answer to a situation (Ross, 2008, p. 5).  A key assumption of this 
research was that the wargaming methodology would provide relative insights that are 
transferable to real-world applications, as described earlier in this chapter.  Relative 
differences in outcomes using a wargame model evaluated under two different conditions 
should approximate the relative differences that would be obtained in the real world when 
fought under the same two different conditions.   
As previously mentioned, in place of active human players for the Blue and Red 
sides in the experiments, the model’s developers made several assumptions in the 
programming of the model’s algorithms.  Blue aircraft were programmed to attack the 
highest priority targets within range.  Half of the Blue airborne defensive counterair 
(DCA) combat air patrols in other sectors were permitted to be used under centralized 
control to defend against a Red attack in another sector, while the others defended their 
home sector.  Finally, the Red strike aircraft were programmed to attack Blue airfields 
rather than attacking the Blue C2 nodes (Tiller, interview, August 6, 2018). 
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Definitions of Terms 
Centralized control   In joint air operations, placing within one  
commander the responsibility and authority for 
planning, directing, and coordinating a military 
operation or group/category of operations (JP 3-30, 
p. GL-6). 
Command    The authority that a commander in the armed forces 
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of 
rank or assignment (JP 1, 2017, p. 41). 
 Command and Control    The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission (JP 1, 2017, p. 41). 
Control      Authority that may be less than full command  
exercised by a commander over part of the activities 
of subordinate or other organizations (JP 1, 2017, p. 
50). 
Decentralized Control In joint air operations, delegating to a subordinate 
commander the responsibility and authority for 
planning, directing, and coordinating a military 
operation or group/category of operations (not 
defined in joint doctrine). 
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Decentralized execution Delegation of execution authority to subordinate 
  commanders (JP 3-30, p. GL-6). 
 
List of Acronyms 
AETF Air expeditionary task force 
AOC Air Operations Center 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ASOC Air Support Operations Center  
ATO Air Tasking Order 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment 
C2 Command and Control 
CAOC Combined Air Operations Center 
CAS Close Air Support 
CFACC Combined Force Air Component Commander 
CNA Computer Network Attack 
CRC Control and Reporting Center 
DCA Defensive Counterair 
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
JAEX Joint Air Exercise 
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander 
JFC Joint Force Commander 
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JP Joint Publication 
JSOAC Joint Special Operations Air Component 
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force 
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
OCA Offensive Counterair 
ROE Rules of engagement 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
TACP Tactical Air Control Party 
TACS Theater Air Control System 
TAGS Theater Air-Ground System 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USAF U.S. Air Force 
USMC U.S. Marine Corps 
USN U. S. Navy 
WOC Wing Operations Center 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
“You can observe a lot by watching.” 
 
      -- Yogi Berra (Berra, 1998, p. 123) 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on subjects relevant to the study of the 
effectiveness of airpower under centralized versus decentralized modes of control.  The 
chapter includes a discussion of pertinent descriptions and history, the tradeoffs involved 
between centralization and decentralization of control of joint airpower operations, and a 
brief speculation about the future of airpower command and control. 
Inherent Tensions between Centralization and Decentralization 
Effectively executing command and control requires an understanding of inherent 
tensions and balancing the tradeoffs between different organizational and process 
arrangements.  Centralization versus decentralization represents the key dynamic in these 
tradeoffs.  Other related tradeoffs include balancing dispersal versus consolidation of 
resources, the degree of autonomy versus interdependence, the drive for efficiency versus 
effectiveness in applying resources, the push for robustness (being strong against 
particular threats) versus flexible resilience (being adaptive and able to adjust against 
unforeseen threats), and the balance between quality versus quantity (Lyle, 2018).  As 
Hinote (2009) pointed out, there are no simple answers; he relates the tradeoffs and 
tensions to what Liddell Hart called a duality: “Like a coin, it has two faces … hence the 
need for a well-calculated compromise as a means to reconciliation” (p. 1).  This 
dissertation analyzes some of those compromises.  Before discussing factors bearing on 
the tradeoffs, the paper will review historical context pertinent to the study. 
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Definitional Issues 
Many writings on command and control start with attempts to clarify definitions.  
As alluded to in the previous chapter, the terms command, control, centralization, 
decentralization, and execution all have nuanced definitions that can create confusion and 
contribute to miscommunication (Baltrusaitis, 2004, p. 3).  A key area of uncertainty with 
the terms results from the overlap of control with execution.  In fact, in the early 1970s, 
official Air Force doctrine contained language supporting centralized allocation and 
direction, then included the assertion that “decentralized control and execution are 
fundamental to the effective application of aerospace power” (AF Manual 1-1, 1971, p. 2-
1).  Later versions of Air Force doctrine evolved toward the current fundamental tenet of 
centralized control, decentralized execution (USAF Doctrine Annex 3-30, 2015b, p. 8).   
Some of the confusion regarding these terms is related to their having multiple 
meanings, depending on context.  The following are the doctrinal definitions of 
centralized control, as described in the most current version of the DOD Dictionary 
(2018, p. 33):  
1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target 
assignments to fire units (JP 3-01). 
2. In joint air operations, placing within one commander the responsibility and 
authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or 
group/category of operations.  See also decentralized control (JP 3-30).  
 
There are, in fact, significant differences between centralized control of air 
defense-specific operations and centralized control of joint air operations.  An example of 
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the air defense application of this definition would be the detailed tactical direction given 
to the aircrew of interceptor aircraft by a ground control intercept specialist monitoring a 
radar display, much as an air traffic controller might provide vectors and altitudes to the 
crew of a commercial aircraft.  This is clearly different from the context of centralized 
control application at the operational level involving planning, directing, and 
coordinating joint air operations (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014a, p. I-3).  Further adding 
to the confusion is the definition of decentralized control in joint doctrine:  
In air defense, the normal mode whereby a higher echelon monitors unit actions, 
making direct target assignments to units only when necessary to ensure proper 
fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft.  See also 
centralized control.  (JP 3-01) (DOD Dictionary, 2018, p. 62)   
 
Thus, only the air defense definition of decentralized control is formally codified; 
there is no definition of decentralized control with respect to joint airpower command and 
control.  The mixing of air defense terminology with that of command and control writ 
large and the absence of a definition of decentralized control in the context of command 
and control are at odds with the precision with which authoritative joint doctrine is 
generally written.  This discrepancy is among the reasons Hinote (2009) cited in claiming 
the Air Force’s central tenet has become “a lightning rod for emotional criticism and 
intellectual challenge” (p. 55).  Parramore (2004) argued the definition of decentralized 
execution is also imprecise, with the result that conditions of centralized execution may 
be unrecognizable.  Santicola (1996) devoted a section of his master’s thesis to the 
problems created by “doctrinal imprecision” (p. 8).  Ankerstar (2005) suggested that the 
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definitional confusion is so severe that the Air Force should abandon the existing 
terminology in its master tenet.  He argued for a more thoughtful understanding of the 
contextual factors leading senior leaders to select a level of control along a continuum 
from autonomous operations to being actively involved in control of execution details.  
The next section summarizes the historical background behind the current master tenet, 
before describing potential impacts of decentralizing control of joint airpower. 
Historical Context for Centralized Control 
The history of airpower command and control debate and doctrine offers 
important insights into the issues addressed in this research.  These insights include the 
intellectual and institutional elements of the debate and their steady progress toward a 
centralized model. 
As early as WWI, proponents saw the value of centralized command and control 
of airpower.  Early airpower theorists argued that airpower must be used strategically and 
operated independently of surface forces.  Douhet (1921) argued for “the necessity of 
having an air force capable of accomplishing war missions solely with its own means, to 
the complete exclusion of both army and navy” (p. 5).  He further argued that the use of 
airpower as an auxiliary to army or navy forces is “worthless, superfluous, and harmful” 
(p. 101).  Late in WWI, Mitchell exercised centralized control over 1,500 Allied aircraft 
supporting General Pershing’s forces at St. Mihiel, France, in what Mitchell termed “the 
greatest combined force of aviation ever brought under one command” (Mitchell, 1925, 
p. 30).  The writings of these and similarly-minded airpower theorists carried significant 
influence as the U.S. and Great Britain developed their nascent air arms during the 
interwar period.   
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 During the period between the two world wars, the quests for independence and 
for centralized control of airpower were consistent themes of airpower advocates during 
this important period of airpower development.  Internal Army debates and formal 
doctrines sought a balance between centrally controlled aviation operations and 
decentralized control of air units assigned directly to ground units for their direct support.  
Even some senior non-aviators within the Army argued for centralizing the air effort.  
Lieutenant General McNair, the commander of the Army’s General Headquarters and 
later commander of Army Ground Forces, supported central management of air 
resources.  He argued central control was necessary to ensure air superiority was given 
sufficient priority and because he recognized that lower-echelon commanders would 
likely misuse resources (Mortensen, 1987, p. 22).  McNair opposed decentralization, 
which was favored by the field commanders, even though decentralization promised 
speedier response time.  Most ground commanders perceived the long command and 
control communications chain in a centralized system would guarantee friction and 
consequently impede air assistance during combat (Mortensen, p. 23). 
 The issue of decentralization by assigning air units to ground commanders came 
to a head at the beginning of the American involvement in WWII.  The Northwest Africa 
campaign in WWII began with the XII Air Support Command’s air assets charged with 
direct support to ground commanders (Rife, 1999, p. 71).  Army doctrine at the time, 
including Army Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, stipulated 
that the air support command should be assigned to assist ground forces (Justice, 2004,  
p. 2).  Rife agreed with this assessment, although arguing that this interpretation was 
largely due to ambiguities and inconsistencies in the language of the doctrine document 
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(p. 72).  As a result, the air support command’s airpower in Operation Torch, the Allied 
effort to push the Axis forces out of North Africa, was initially constrained to providing 
direct support to the ground units to which it was assigned, and localized air superiority.  
Momyer (2003) argued that the application of this doctrine meant that no one was 
responsible for gaining air superiority across the theater of operations, since the ground 
commanders were concerned only with the enemy aircraft that might attack their own 
formations (p. 44).  Leading up to the Battle for Kasserine Pass, the air assets allocated to 
specific ground units were used largely as airborne artillery (Hathaway, 2011, p. 4).   
The primary problem with assigning air units to ground commanders was 
summed up by Luftwaffe General Karl Koller: “Every soldier generally thinks only as far 
as the radius of action of his branch of the service” (Charlton, 2013, p. 67).  In one 
famous example, Major General Fredendall, the commander of II Corps, despite 
overseeing a surplus of air support, refused to support an urgent request from a 
neighboring French unit being overrun, on the grounds that his corps had no 
responsibilities in the affected area (Rife, 1999, p. 72).  This anecdote captures the 
essence of the airpower advocates’ argument against decentralization—that breaking 
airpower into small packets and assigning them to subordinate ground commanders 
prevents the most efficient use of limited air assets (Hathaway, p. 4).  The term penny-
packets, attributed to the RAF’s Air Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, has become a widely 
used, pejorative metaphor for the impact of decentralization of airpower.  According to 
Tedder (1946), if airpower is divided into separate packets, it loses its powers of 
concentration.   
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 The turning point from a doctrinal point of view was a series of Allied setbacks, 
culminating in the Allied disastrous showing at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 
1943 (Atkinson, 2002).  Momyer (2003) pointed to this battle as a primary demonstration 
of the folly of airpower broken into parcels and subordinated to ground commanders.  
Ground commanders will understandably husband their assigned air assets to support 
their own requirements, with little motivation for them to support other commanders or to 
provide air assets to attack distant enemy airfields or strategic targets that do not 
immediately threaten their scheme of maneuver.  Because there was no air commander 
advocating for the air superiority mission, Kasserine Pass was the only important ground 
battle of WWII in which the Allies did not have air superiority over the Luftwaffe (Rife, 
p. 71).   
In the aftermath of the Kasserine Pass fiasco, Army doctrine solidified around the 
concept of centralized control.  In July 1943, the Army introduced a major shift in 
doctrine, in the form of Field Manual 100-20.  The new manual’s language included the 
following assertion of the need to centralize airpower: 
Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces ….  Control of 
available air power must be centralized, and command must be exercised through 
the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive 
blow are to be fully exploited.  (War Department, 1944, p. 2) 
 
Dysfunctional command arrangements resulting from interservice friction were 
not limited to the European theater during WWII.  Another example, briefly alluded to in 
the previous chapter, was the relationship between the key commanders in the Pacific 
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campaign during World War II.  Unable to agree on a single commander for this theater 
of operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff split the Pacific into two commands in 1943.  The 
Navy received responsibility for the Central Pacific advance toward Japan, while the 
Army island-hopped its way toward Japan in the southwest Pacific (Griffith, 1998).  At 
points where the two forces operated in close proximity, there was considerable friction 
between the Army Air Forces and Navy air commanders (Griffith, pp. 119-121).  This 
friction extended into the air domain, as the competing air and naval commanders 
coordinated their aviation activities without benefit of a single manager.  As Locher 
(2002) noted, the failure to identify a single commander for the Pacific campaign 
“doomed the Pacific theater to four decades of discord among the services and 
underachievement or failure on the battlefield” (p. 200).   
After WWII, the Air Force was created as a separate military service, but there 
was little support from the other services regarding centralizing control of the airpower 
capabilities of the military services’ various aviation arms.  Barriers to joint service 
consolidation included service cultures, communications barriers between platforms, and 
the fact that each service had a legitimate need for its aviation arm to support its own 
operational doctrine.  In the Korean conflict, the initial command arrangements in 1950 
provided the commander of the Far East Air Forces with an ambiguous coordination 
control over naval air forces (Momyer, 2003, p. 65), which stopped short of enabling 
concentration of the combined airpower capabilities against the North Koreans.   
The centralization debate flared again during the Vietnam War.  Commanders 
from each military service resisted placing their combat elements under control of 
commanders from other services.  For much of the Vietnam War, the control of the air 
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effort over North Vietnam was decentralized, with the services assigned separate areas, 
termed route packages, depicted in Figure 8.  The targets and flight routes for Air Force 
and Navy assets were geographically separated to deconflict their operations, but there 
was minimal coordination between the two efforts.  Lambeth (2000) argued that this 
fragmented approach violated basic, long-standing beliefs of airpower theorists, and 
denied the Air Force and Navy fighter forces the opportunity to combine their capabilities 
to greatest effect (p. 33).  The arrangement, although suboptimal from an economy-of-
force standpoint, was likely the best that could be obtained given the disagreements at 
senior military service levels regarding control of airpower.  Momyer (2003), despite 
strongly disagreeing with the route package approach, conceded that “the route package 
system was a compromise approach to a tough command and control decision” (p. 108).   
Disagreements on command philosophy were not strictly interservice; within the 
Air Force, Strategic Air Command bombers used in conventional strikes remained under 
command of their home commander in Omaha rather than under the Air Force theater air 
component commander.  Momyer noted “even we airmen couldn’t agree on the 
operational control of the B-52s” (p. 116).  During the Linebacker II operation in 
December 1972, 15 B-52s were shot down over North Vietnam, at least partially 
attributed to poor coordination between various providers of air assets (Michel, 2002; 
Momyer, 2003).  Momyer’s overall conclusion was that such arrangements significantly 
sub-optimize airpower’s potential (p. 122). 
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Figure 8.  Route package system in North Vietnam.  Adapted from Momyer (2003, p. 
107); used with permission. 
 
 
Since the route package system was based on geographic separation of airpower 
efforts, which is one of the points of analysis of this research study, it is worth spending a 
bit of time to analyze this construct.  One benefit of such a system is that the 
deconfliction reduced the challenges of having to conduct detailed coordination between 
Air Force and Navy air units.  Even Air Force General Vogt, who succeeded Momyer as 
Commander of 7th Air Force overseeing the Air Force effort in Vietnam, had to 
grudgingly acknowledge that the route package system “saved a great deal of 
coordination” (Clodfelter, 1989, p. 164).  Another benefit was that units flying together in 
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combat generally had close bonds with others on the same mission, since they belonged 
to the same military service and, in many cases, lived together on the same airbases or 
aircraft carriers.   
There were several drawbacks to the decentralized route package system.  Of key 
importance, the missions for the two air armadas from the Air Force and the Navy were 
planned independently; as a result, aircraft from each service struck targets in their 
assigned route package sector irrespective of the overall prioritization of targets.  The air 
effort lost the opportunity to overwhelm enemy defenses through concentrated, 
synchronized attacks.  Also, when weather precluded attacks in one route package 
section, the assigned assets could not easily be shifted to targets in a neighboring route 
package owned by another service.  The route package arrangement resulted in 
considerable frustration on the part of the aircrews and reduced capability for the overall 
war effort (Clancy & Horner, 1999, p. 217).  A central manager of the airpower effort 
could have readily adjusted the weight of effort based on the supply of air assets, the 
weather, the enemy threat, and target priority.   
Momyer (1975) argued that after the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam in 1972, the 
command and control of the Vietnamese Air Force regressed even further, with airpower 
distributed to various ground commanders contributing to its lack of effectiveness during 
the North Vietnamese offensive of 1975.  “The VNAF was divided up into small packets 
as had been done in the early days of World War II, and as a consequence was 
improperly employed by Corps Commanders whose vision was limited to the situation in 
his Corps area” (p. 69).   
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The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols act in 1986 proved to be a watershed event.  
Locher (2002) argued that the primary motivation for the U.S. Congress to pass this 
legislation was the history of convoluted command relationships caused by interservice 
friction.  The Goldwater-Nichols legislation had as its key objective better integration of 
each of the military service’s separate capabilities into effective joint fighting units.  As 
noted by Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, the National Archives ranked the Goldwater-
Nichols Act as “the Senate Armed Services Committee’s most important legislative 
achievement during its first fifty years” (Locher, p. xii).  The forced integration of multi-
service efforts into joint teams resulted in reduced interservice fighting and better military 
cohesion and was credited by then-Secretary of Defense William Perry with the 
“resounding success of our forces in Desert Storm” (Locher, p. 446).  Subsequent to the 
passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Doctrine for 
Theater Counterair Operations, defining the position of Joint Force Air Component 
Commander (JFACC).  As McNamara (1994) noted, “this was the result of 43 years of 
effort on the part of the Air Force, but it did not occur without dissent” (p. 1). 
After defining the position of JFACC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed a 
compromise to address Marine Corps-specific concerns regarding centralized 
management of its air assets.  In the previous chapter, it was noted that Marine Corps 
doctrine includes strong language regarding the inseparability of its air assets from the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  The Joint Force Air Component Commander, 
however, is guided by the joint airpower doctrinal tenet of centralized control, which 
would dictate that all air assets be centrally managed for maximum efficiency and unity 
of effort.  The 1986 Omnibus Agreement, as it was then known, is now codified in joint 
      47 
 
doctrine.  This doctrine includes direction that USMC air assets will be used primarily to 
support the MAGTF ground element; however, the MAGTF commander is required to 
make sorties available for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range 
reconnaissance.  Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be 
provided to the JFACC for tasking (Joint Publication 1, 2017).  Excess capabilities are as 
determined by the MAGTF commander, although in extreme circumstances, the MAGTF 
commander can be overruled by the Joint Force Commander, who retains the authority to 
assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders 
(Joint Publication 1, 2017, p. IV-4 to IV-5; Murrow & Bray, 1990, p. 74).  During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, to avoid involving the joint force commander in an intra-
service controversy, the CFACC reached an agreement with the MAGTF commander to 
provide USAF A-10 close air support sorties in exchange for USMC F/A-18 long-range 
strike sorties (Lambeth, 2013, pp. 190-191).  This arrangement retained some elements of 
centralized control while enabling the MAGTF to support its organic, decentralized 
requirements. 
Development of the Joint Force Air Component Commander Construct 
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a catalyst for airpower leaders to 
implement their long-sought-after concept of a single manager for airpower.  Not long 
after enactment of the legislation, U.S. European Command established its own Joint 
Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to serve as central coordinator for airpower 
operations (Marquis, 2017, p. 3).  In 1990, the commander of U.S. Central Command, 
General Norman Schwarzkopf, tapped his air component commander, Lieutenant General 
Chuck Horner, to serve as the JFACC for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  
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During the planning for the Gulf War, a senior naval officer suggested to General 
Horner that Iraq should be divided into route packages to reduce coordination 
requirements and maintain unit cohesion, as had been done during the Vietnam conflict.  
Horner, who had flown F-100 combat missions in North Vietnam, had recollections of 
being unable to attack readily visible, lucrative targets because they were in the Navy’s 
route package sector.  Horner vehemently rejected the suggestion, instead insisting that 
General Schwarzkopf had made clear his direction to use a single air manager for the 
impending conflict (Clancy, 1999, p. 217).   
Horner oversaw the planning, coordination, and synchronization of the air 
operation that commenced on January 17, 1991.  This effort integrated a combined air 
armada involving assets from all the military services and participating coalition nations.  
The air operation included strategic attack against key targets throughout Iraq, airbases, 
command and control facilities, lines of communication, and attacking Iraqi ground 
forces when the ground operation was launched forty days later.  While generally seen as 
overwhelmingly successful, some skepticism remained on the part of other services 
(Gordon &Trainor, 1995).  The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) staff was 
predominantly from the Air Force, leading to concerns about the degree of jointness, or 
multi-service coordination, associated with the planning and execution of the air 
operation.  This concern was addressed in subsequent campaigns by the inclusion of 
officers from other services in the CAOC staff, and, in some cases, placing senior officers 
from other services and other countries in CAOC leadership positions.  For example, 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the deputy CFACC was a navy admiral, and the CAOC 
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director positions were filled by senior officers from the U.S. Air Force, Britain’s Royal 
Air Force, and from the Royal Australian Air Force (Lambeth, 2013, p. 216).   
During the initial phases of Desert Storm, the ground forces’ leadership expressed 
concerns to General Schwarzkopf about inadequate priority for close air support and 
complained that their nominated targets did not receive sufficient priority.  General 
Horner subsequently implemented a push-CAS concept, in which pre-planned CAS 
sorties were launched in anticipation of ground commanders’ requests (Horner, 2000, p. 
21).  If, after the sorties launched, there was no immediate need for CAS, the aircraft 
attacked targets in the enemy rear area.  This arrangement ensured there was no shortage 
of available airpower when needed by the ground force commanders yet minimized 
wasting airpower capabilities on CAS missions that did not materialize before the aircraft 
ran low on fuel (Lambeth, 2000, p. 132).  In addition, each service retained control of 
some portion of its air assets, termed organic, to support its own requirements, so there 
were aspects of airpower not within the JFACC’s purview to control.  But, overall, most 
observers saw Desert Storm as a validation of the JFACC construct (Marquis, 2017, p. 9).   
The designation of a functional component as the single manager for airpower 
became the standard during the series of conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc in 1991.  When multiple countries are involved, the position is referred to as the 
Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC).  The single air manager 
construct has been successfully employed in combat in the NATO operation to halt ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, and Operation Unified Protector in Libya (Lambeth, 2001, 2005).   
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During Operation Desert Storm, Horner operated out of a command center 
established in the basement of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation in Riyadh 
(Clancy, 1999, p. 200).  Since then, the Air Force has made a significant effort to 
professionalize the air operations centers from which the JFACCs or CFACCs will 
operate.  Each of the various AOCs evolved individually based on the needs of its 
circumstance.  In 2000, the Air Force Chief of Staff designated the AOCs as a weapon 
system, which elevated the AOC’s status and obliged the Air Force leadership to increase 
priority for allocation of trained personnel and resources (Justice, 2004, p. 15).   
Centralization Versus Decentralization 
 The preceding historical analysis outlines a general trend toward greater 
centralization in airpower command and control of airpower.  However, there remain 
strong voices on both sides of the issue among those who have thought deeply about 
command and control.   
In Command in War, van Creveld (1985) described the spectrum of command and 
the implications of choosing a more centralized or decentralized approach to command 
and control (C2).  He used a case study approach to illustrate the nature of command to 
argue that the centralized approach requires increased information collection and 
processing capacity and leads to greater communications requirements and a larger, more 
complex central-directing organ.  In van Creveld’s view, decentralized C2 requires 
organizations to operate with less information, or to divide the C2 task into smaller pieces 
that specialized subcomponents can handle independently.  It should be noted that the 
bulk of van Creveld’s case studies predated the modern airpower era, focusing on ancient 
Greek and Roman warriors: Alexander, Napolean, and the von Moltkes of Prussia.  The 
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most modern case study examined by van Creveld was the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 
in which the only airpower he discussed is the Army’s fleet of helicopters.  Throughout 
his book, van Creveld argued that senior commanders should employ a “directed 
telescope” to keep apprised of the activities of subordinates without impeding tactical 
initiative, relying on messengers, later telegraphs, and more recently radio 
communications.  Yet when discussing airpower in Vietnam, he roundly criticized the use 
of helicopters in the role of directed telescopes to monitor and micromanage the activities 
of each subsequent level (pp. 232-260).  In the end, van Creveld, while acknowledging 
the improvements in communications technologies, made clear his conviction that 
decentralization is superior to centralization.  He argued that decision thresholds are best 
located as far down the command structure as possible, and supported creation of 
balanced, self-contained units that can exploit freedom of action at the tactical level.  He 
noted that the choices between centralization and decentralization boil down to a 
readiness to accept greater uncertainty at higher headquarters while simultaneously 
reducing uncertainty at lower levels (p. 274).   
Kometer’s (2007) Command in Air War can be characterized as an airman’s 
response to van Creveld’s Command in War.  Kometer analyzed the impact of 
information technology on the doctrinal tenet of centralized control and decentralized 
execution, examining airpower command and control during Operations Desert Storm, 
Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.  Over the course of the period 
analyzed, the Air Operations Center emerged as the central figure in the planning, 
tasking, and assessment of combat airpower operations.  Kometer made extensive use of 
primary research, including interviews and original documents.  He introduced the 
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concept of a Combat Air Operations System (CAOS) which treats all C2 participants as 
being part of a single system.  Kometer also discussed the important notion of system 
coupling, in which individual tasks are assembled to execute a mission (p. 72).  System 
coupling complicates efforts to decentralize control of specific tasks, since those tasks 
may be linked to others requiring a more centralized direction.  An example might be 
short-range fighters, which are often integrated with longer-range tankers for mission 
execution.  Kometer, building on the work of Perrow (1999), asserted that tightly coupled 
systems are best centralized, while complex, loosely coupled systems can be 
decentralized (p. 61). 
 Gerber (1997) noted that Air Force leaders tend to link decentralization with both 
inefficiency and suboptimal use of finite resources.  Yet he noted that there are trends in 
modern business, government, economics, science, and computer and communications 
systems that suggest that decentralized C2 can, in fact, be more effective and efficient 
than a highly centralized structure.  Using complexity theory, Gerber developed a 
networked hierarchical organization to build a predominantly decentralized C2 system.  
This system employed mission-type orders, requiring revisions in training, doctrine, and 
education.  Gerber argued his decentralized model could provide theater air component 
commanders with a spectrum of options for organizing the C2 structure.  
 Gray (1999) developed a theory of airpower expressed in 27 dicta, or axioms.  
Dictum 14 argues that “the air is one, and so is airpower” (p. 286).  Gray expressed 
concern that non-air-minded military leaders will fail to understand how to best employ 
airpower, while recognizing that airmen may exhibit parochial concern for air-specific 
matters at the expense of their joint allies.  In contrast to van Creveld, Gray argued that 
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the “geography of air warfare and the necessary nature and evolving character of 
airpower demand that a centralizing approach to the air be the default wisdom” (p. 287).   
Decauer’s (2014) work is largely supportive of the doctrinal tenet of centralized 
control / decentralized execution.  Decauer introduced the notion of operational 
flexibility, a term describing “harmonizing operations to maximize the effectiveness of 
airpower through the range of military operations” (p. 32).  Fundamentally, operational 
flexibility places increased C2 capabilities at lower levels to improve coordination with 
other components during planning and execution.  While Decauer’s discussion did not 
include concerns regarding resilience of the C2 structure, this concept would appear to 
have applicability to the problem posed in this research.   
Alberts, along with Hayes (2003, 2006) and Manso (2012), have extensively 
researched the subject of military command and control.  Together they orchestrated 
DOD’s Command and Control Research Program for several years before establishing 
the International Command and Control Institute, where Alberts serves as president.  
Alberts and Hayes (2003) noted that control determines “whether current and/or planned 
efforts are on track.  If adjustments are required, the function of control is to make these 
adjustments if they are within the guidelines established by command” (p. 59).  They 
advocated pushing control as much as possible to the edge, rather than centralizing.  
Their review of evidence from 20th century command and control case studies concluded 
that the appropriate approach depended on several factors, including: 
 The warfighting environment–from static to mobile 
 The continuity of communications  
 The volume and quality of information  
      54 
 
 The professional competence of the decision makers and their forces 
 The degree of creativity and initiative that decision makers (particularly 
subordinate commanders) are expected to exercise (Alberts & Hayes, 2003,   
p. 19) 
Cyr (2014) included a discussion on distributed C2, described as “moving 
authorities for certain C2 tasks down to the tactical level of war” (p. 22) to better cope 
with degraded or contested environments.  He acknowledged the uneasiness associated 
with the risks of moving previously centrally-controlled aspects of C2 to the edge as 
described in Alberts and Hayes (2003). 
The notion of distributed control can be considered a hybrid approach between 
polar extremes of centralization and decentralization.  Baran (1964) described advantages 
and disadvantages of each architecture in the context of communications networks.  
Figure 9 depicts simplified depictions of centralized, decentralized, and distributed 
networked organizations.  Baran’s paper, though written over 50 years ago, contains 
observations that support today’s analysis of C2 networks.  For example, Baran noted 
“The centralized node is obviously vulnerable as destruction of a single central node 
destroys communication between the end stations” (p. 1).   
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Figure 9.  Centralized, decentralized, and distributed network depictions.  From Baran, 
1964, p. 2.  Used with permission. 
 
 
More recently, Hukill and Mortensen (2011) argued that the Air Force has 
become wedded to a “one-size fits all” configuration, inhibiting fully effective command 
and control across the spectrum of conflict (p. 53).  They expressed concern that the 
focus on airpower C2 at the combatant-commander level will limit airpower’s flexibility 
in responding to situations requiring decision authority below the theater level.  In their 
view, centralizing at “the appropriate level of command” (p. 54) will be necessary for 
airpower to be able to effectively respond to situations across the full range of military 
operations.  Centralizing at the appropriate level of command would necessarily involve 
decentralizing at least some aspects of airpower from the current emphasis on the theater-
command level; this is reflective of the two-sides-of-the-same coin argument mentioned 
earlier.  It should be noted that Hukill and Mortensen’s concerns are focused on 
airpower’s effectiveness to respond to the complex operating environments that the future 
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portends, without mentioning the need for decentralization to maintain resiliency in the 
face of threats to a centralized C2 structure. 
The centralization-decentralization debate extends into other fields, including 
organizational theory.  A study by Kanth, Mohapatra, Mohanty, and Basak (2013) 
claimed software firms could save up to 10% on software testing by centralizing the 
process.  On the other hand, Lauver and Trank (2012) argued that organizational 
centralization can have a negative impact on safety, even citing the National Commission 
on BP Deepwater Horizon, which claimed a BP decision to centralize oversight functions 
contributed to the disaster. 
Various metaphors have been used to help visualize centralized and decentralized 
organizational structures.  Morgan (1993) used a house plant metaphor to describe the 
benefits of decentralized organizational structure; the centralized organization is 
represented by a robust potted plant with scrawny subsidiary offshoots that wither and 
die, while the decentralized organization is represented by a spider plant with healthy, 
self-sufficient offshoots.  Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) used a spider versus starfish 
metaphor to show that a central decision-making node may be at a disadvantage 
compared to an organization with distributed cognition.  A spider whose legs have been 
severed will wither and die, while the more resilient starfish will grow new arms to 
replace severed ones.  One challenge with applying this metaphor involves retaining the 
spider-like organization’s capacity for learning and its agility, while reaping the benefits 
of the resilience of the starfish-like organizations.   
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C2 Constructs for Distributing or Decentralizing Control  
While trending over time toward greater centralization, airpower command and 
control will need to include options for decentralized or distributed control to enhance 
resiliency in the face of threats to the C2 structure.  Lyle (2014) argued that a holistic C2 
structure must be able to support four key functions: build situational awareness, translate 
commander’s intent, produce feasible plans, and conduct mission control (p. 59-60).  
Some general options for decentralizing or distributing control could include:   
 Within the JFACC construct, distributing the command and control 
responsibilities to subordinate control nodes.  This construct could enhance 
resiliency in the face of threats to a centralized Air Operations Center.  The 
network of multiple subordinate control nodes would present challenges to an 
adversary attempting to decapitate the friendly air component C2 structure.  
This concept could involve employing existing structures (such as Control and 
Reporting Centers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, Air 
Support Operations Centers, or individual Wing Operations Centers) that have 
been trained and equipped to operate under a distributed control structure 
without guidance and support from a JFACC’s Air Operations Center.  The 
resulting C2 structure might resemble either Figure 9b (decentralized) or 
Figure 9c (distributed) control. 
 Assigning subordinate joint force commanders their own service and 
functional air components, rather than having them depend on support from 
the superior commander’s air component.  The assignment or attachment of 
air forces to a subordinate joint force commander represents a type of 
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decentralization.  Creating separate air components for joint force 
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, both within the U.S. Central Command 
area of responsibility, would have represented an example of this approach.  
Figure 10 depicts a notional organizational structure with subordinate joint 
task forces, each with its own JFACC.  Note that the theater JFACC could 
retain some forces to be used to support theater requirements or used to 
support the highest priority requirements between the two JTFs.  These 
theater-level platforms would likely be available in limited supply and would 
need to have sufficient range to support either JTF; such platforms typically 
include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, air refueling 
aircraft, or long-range airlift aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Depiction of organizational option for sub-theater JFACCs supporting 
multiple joint task forces.  Adapted from McLean, 2017, slide16.  Used with permission. 
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 Operating with service components (Air Force component, Navy component, 
Marine Corps component, etc.), with each service responsible for specific 
missions or specific geographical operating areas.  This approach would 
represent a reversion to parochial decentralization along service lines, as each 
service component would employ its organic air assets, deconflicted from 
each other by time or space, reminiscent of the previously described route 
package system employed in the Vietnam conflict.  The organizational 
depiction could resemble that of the service components in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Organizing the joint force using service components.  Adapted from McLean, 
2017, slide 15.  Used with permission. 
 
 
The present research is not intended to compare different modalities of 
decentralizing control; rather, the above discussion is provided to give a general idea of 
C2 options that might be used depending on the operational circumstance and preferences 
of the combatant commander.  The research effort compares a centralized JFACC model, 
such as that depicted in Figure 2 of the previous chapter, with a decentralized structure, 
which could take the form of one of those discussed in this section.   
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Dissecting Factors in the Balance Between Centralization and Decentralization 
As articulated in the previous chapter, this research focuses on the quantitative 
analyses of operational factors that influence the tradeoffs between centralization and 
decentralization of airpower command and control.  Several previous research efforts 
have laid the groundwork for the present study.   
Hinote’s (2009) monograph Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution—A 
Catchphrase in Crisis? provides a thorough historical review of the evolution of the 
central doctrinal tenet, including an assessment of the application of the doctrinal tenet to 
the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  One of the most important considerations in 
the orchestration of joint airpower, one that Hinote (2009) argued is “perhaps the most 
important consideration” (p. 58), is the degree to which command and control is 
centralized.  As discussed previously in this chapter, Hinote pointed out that one of the 
major difficulties with the foundational tenet is the language itself— centralized control 
itself is misunderstood, misinterpreted, and controversial.  The tenet has undergone 
occasional adjustments throughout airpower’s relatively brief history; in fact, the Air 
Force has, at various times, argued the essentiality of both centralized control and 
decentralized control.   
Hinote (2009) suggested a more appropriate summation of the doctrine would be 
“Centralized command and control at the strategic and operational levels of war, 
decentralized execution at the tactical level” (p. 57).  The operational level is defined as 
“the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, 
and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas” 
(DOD Dictionary, 2018, p. 173).  Hinote pointed out that airpower is ideally applied at 
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the tactical level with an eye toward connecting tactical results with strategic objectives 
(p. 18).  A key assertion in Hinote’s monograph is that the appropriate degree of 
centralization of command and control required for effective airpower employment 
hinges on answers to five fundamental questions (pp. 59-64), summarized in Figure 12.  
The questions that are directly pertinent to the present research are highlighted in bold 
text in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Hinote’s five questions to find the balance between centralization and 
decentralization (Hinote, 2009, pp. 58-64).  Note: The questions that are applicable to this 
study are in bold type. 
 
1. What is the nature of the operation?  
 Strategic attack => Centralization 
 Close Air Support => Decentralization 
2. Where should flexibility be preserved? 
 Nuclear operations => Centralization  
 When tactical actions can lead to political consequences, Centralization is 
appropriate 
 Tactical air operations in direct support to ground forces => Decentralization  
 Decentralization allows airpower to be redistributed among tactical control nodes  
3. What is the geographical range of effects?  
 Assets that can flex from area to area => Centralization 
 E.g., long-range bombers, ISR platforms, space and cyber assets 
 Assets with limited range => Decentralization 
 E.g., short-range, unrefuelable platforms 
4. How many assets are available?  
 The more assets available to the Joint Force Commander, the less the requirement for 
centralization 
5. Who has the best situational awareness? 
 Time Sensitive Targeting => Centralized at Air Ops Center 
 Local air engagements => Decentralized (CRC, AWACS) 
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Hukill et al. (2012) argued that the Air Force needs to reconsider its strong 
preference for centralizing airpower command and control at the theater level.  In their 
monograph Air Force Command and Control: The Need for Increased Adaptability the 
authors provided options for decentralizing aspects of the airpower C2 structure, in order 
to improve responsiveness to lower-level commanders requirements and to improve 
resilience against near-peer adversaries.  In a vein similar to Hinote’s monograph, Hukill 
et al. identified five key qualitative factors that influence the design of an airpower C2 
structure (pp. 8-10), summarized in Figure 13.  The factors that are directly pertinent to 
the present research are highlighted in bold text in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Hukill et al.’s five influences on the fundamental elements of command and 
control (Hukill et. al., 2012, pp. 8-10).  Note: The factors that are applicable to this study 
are in bold type. 
 
1.  Nature of the operation  
 Airlift, strategic attack => Centralization 
 Air support to distributed land fight => Decentralization 
2.  Available resources 
 Scarcity of assets => Centralization 
 Plentiful supply of assets => Decentralization 
3.  Capabilities of subordinate units  
 Subordinates dependent on detailed guidance => Centralization 
 Subordinates organized, trained, and equipped to operate independent of detailed 
guidance => Decentralization 
 
4.  Degree of trust and confidence 
 Low degree of trust and confidence => Centralization 
 High degree of trust and confidence => Decentralization 
5.  Political risk 
 High degree of political risk from military activities => Centralization 
 Lower degree of political risk from military activities => Decentralization 
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Betts (2014), in Airpower’s Master Tenet and Anti-Access / Area Denial: Hope Is 
Not a Course of Action, argued that with the rise of adversaries with the potential 
capability to paralyze the central decision-making nodes, the Air Force must be prepared 
to decentralize its doctrinal command and control model.  While both Hinote’s (2009) 
and Hukill et al.’s primary focus was on issues associated with the appropriate level of 
airpower C2 for maximum effect, Betts (2014) argued that a primary consideration must 
be resiliency in the face of threats to the C2 network.  Hinote’s and Hukill et al.’s 
discussions regarding balancing centralization and decentralization presumed robust 
connectivity between control nodes and the execution level.  Betts claimed that with the 
rise of adversaries with the potential capability to paralyze the central decision-making 
nodes, the Air Force should transition to a doctrinal command and control model he 
summarized as: centralized command, adaptive control, and decentralized execution. 
Betts derived seven elemental factors to guide the appropriate degree of 
centralization or decentralization, as shown in Figure 14.  Betts depicted his factors on 
sliding scales, each creating a band between complete centralization and complete 
decentralization.  Finding an alignment of the sliding scales could facilitate finding an 
appropriate balance between the two extremes.  The factors that are directly pertinent to 
the present research are highlighted in bold text in the figure. 
Although the alignments are not precise, Hinote’s five questions, Hukill et al.’s 
five influences, and Betts’s seven elemental factors overlap in several respects.  The 
preceding three figures show some common threads between the studies.  All three of 
those studies discuss centralization and decentralization in qualitative terms; this research 
subjected several of the operational considerations identified by those researchers to 
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quantitative scrutiny: the geographic range of effects, the quantity and capability of assets 
available relative to the demand for airpower, and the relative capabilities of the 
centralized versus the decentralized C2 nodes, as discussed below.  
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Betts’s seven elemental determinants to balance centralization and 
decentralization (Betts, 2014, p. 8).  Note: The Betts determinants applicable to this study 
are in bold type.   
 
 
1.  Time Available in Decision Cycle 
 More time available => Enables centralization 
 Less time available => Forces decentralization 
2.  Bandwidth (Comm/Data) 
 More bandwidth available => Enables centralization 
 Less bandwidth available => Forces decentralization 
3.  Geographic Range of Effects 
 Greater geographic range => Enables centralization 
 Less geographic range => Forces decentralization 
 
4.  Scarcity of Platforms 
 Fewer platforms available => Forces centralization 
 More platforms available => Enables decentralization 
5.  Need for Higher Level Synchronization 
 Large requirement for higher Level Synchronization => Forces centralization 
 Less requirement for higher-level synchronization => Enables decentralization 
6.  Sensitivity to Unintended Consequences 
 High sensitivity to unintended consequences => Forces centralization 
 Low sensitivity to unintended consequences => Enables decentralization 
7.  Mistrust of Subordinate Process Ownership (Situational Awareness, Competence, Initiative) 
 Less trust in subordinates => Forces centralization 
 More trust in subordinates => Enables decentralization 
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 Geographic range of effects.  Hinote (2009) and Betts (2014) both argued that 
the balance shifts toward decentralization when assets are range-limited, such as is the 
case with rotary winged assets and some unmanned aerial systems (UASs).  The rationale 
is straightforward: since range-limited assets are restricted to operating in a confined 
area, there is much less capability to apply these airpower assets in a flexible manner 
against the greatest requirements across a wide area.  This observation is neither new nor 
particularly surprising; the 1943 Army doctrinal publication FM 100-20 contained a 
caveat supporting decentralization when forces are “operating independently or are 
isolated by distance” (War Department, 1944, p. 2).   
Each of the operational conditions in this research has an opposite side to its coin.  
In the case of the range of assets, the inverse is also true: longer-range assets should 
move the balance toward centralization, because they are more capable of being applied 
against the greatest needs of the joint force across a wide area.  The capabilities of air 
assets that can reach an entire theater of operations, or across the globe, will likely be 
suboptimized if assigned to subordinate command and control nodes (Hinote, 2009, p. 
61).   
Quantity and capabilities of assets available.  Hinote (2009), Hukill et al. 
(2012), and Betts (2014) all argued that the greater the quantity of assets available to the 
joint force air component commander, the less the requirement for centralization.  The 
rationale is straight-forward: as the number of assets under decentralized control 
increases, the closer each decentralized sector will come to near-self-sufficiency, with an 
associated reduction in the need for centralization.  As is the case with geographic range, 
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the inverse can also be argued: scarcity of assets drives centralization, since with fewer 
assets there is an associated greater requirement to apply those scarce assets against the 
highest priority requirements, which may happen to be outside the area under control of a 
decentralized node. 
 Deptula (2001) would likely argue that all three have it wrong; Deptula 
maintained the number of assets available is not as important as the capabilities they 
bring.  Simply stated, increasing the number of lower-capable assets may not prove as 
effective as replacing them with an equal number of higher-capable assets.  Deptula made 
his point visually as depicted in Figure 15, showing that a small number of highly capable 
platforms can be more effective than greater numbers of platforms with less capability.   
 
 
Figure 15.  Impact of increased munition precision on the concept of mass.  From 
Deptula, 2001, p. 8.  Used with permission. 
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In an extreme example, one B-2 bomber delivering 16 precision-guided munitions 
(PGMs) could theoretically neutralize as many discrete targets as would have required 
16,000 B-17 sorties conducting high-altitude bombing in WWII.  An internal Air Force 
memorandum supports this general conclusion, while noting that the trade-off analysis is 
clouded by the likelihood that the thousands of non-precision weapons dropped would 
create additional collateral damage and casualties (Owen, memorandum to J. Warden, 
September 1, 1991).  Despite the caveats, Hinote’s, Hukill et al.’s, and Betts’ assertions 
regarding the effect of increasing the quantity of assets would be better phrased in terms 
of weapon system capabilities, rather than simple numbers.  This research effort 
addresses both the effects of increasing the numbers and the effects of increasing the 
capabilities of Blue assets. 
Degradation of the capabilities of the centralized C2 node.  The final factor to 
be analyzed in this study is the impact of degrading the C2 capabilities and capacities of 
the centralized node, while holding the decentralized control nodes’ capabilities constant.  
In Hinote’s (2009) study, this factor is addressed in Question Five regarding degree of 
situational awareness at each of the command nodes.  If the centralized control node has a 
high degree of situational awareness, then the airpower assets will be most effectively 
orchestrated from the central node.  Hinote provided an example in which the central 
node may have access to intelligence unavailable at a lower level, thus its capability to 
orchestrate air operations may be greater, relative to the decentralized nodes.  By the 
same token, lower-level decentralized control nodes, such as a Control and Reporting 
Center, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or Wing Operations Centers may 
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have better real-time awareness of the tactical situation and be in a better position to 
direct defensive counterair operations, relative to the more distant, higher-level 
centralized node.  Hukill et al. (2012) approached this issue of relative capabilities of 
centralized versus decentralized C2 nodes through the capabilities of subordinate units.  
They argue such subordinate units can be effective if properly organized, trained, and 
equipped (p. 9).  Betts (2014) approached the issue of relative capabilities of the control 
nodes through a different, more nuanced lens than that of either Hinote or Hukill et al.; 
Betts broke this factor into two determinants: relative bandwidth and relative force 
capabilities. 
 Relative bandwidth.  Betts (2014) referenced the factors that Alberts and Hayes 
(2003) identified for determining the appropriate C2 approach, discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  Particularly germane are two key considerations:  
 The continuity of communications, which may vary from limited to 
continuous 
 The quality and volume of information moving between echelons and 
functions (Betts, 2014, p. 8) 
Betts (2014) combined these factors to form his second determinant, that of 
bandwidth.  The bandwidth factor is an indicator of the robustness of the connections 
between the C2 nodes and their associated warfighters.  As Betts hypothesized, reduced 
bandwidth forces decentralization of command and control, since the command elements 
have reduced capability to provide direction to subordinate forces.  It is worth noting that 
the 1943 Army doctrinal publication FM 100-20 included a caveat that advises against 
decentralization unless ground forces are isolated by “lack of communication” (War 
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Department, 1944, p. 2).  This reduction in bandwidth could be a result of technical 
failures, or, in a conflict with a near-peer competitor, could be a result of physical or 
cyberspace attack on the centralized command center.  Presuming subordinate nodes have 
greater resilience, due for example to proximity to their forces or to robust service-
specific links, the relative capability of subordinate nodes will increase compared to that 
of the centralized node.   
 Relative force capabilities.  Betts (2014) described his seventh determinant as 
“mistrust of subordinate process ownership” (p. 10), combining such factors as 
situational awareness, subordinate force competence, and subordinate force commander 
initiative.  Essentially this determinant compares the effectiveness of a force when 
operating in decentralized mode with that when commanded from a central node.  
Decentralization may, for example, offer the advantages of increased speed of the 
decision cycle, operating with formed teams, and increased initiative, at the expense of 
coordinated action and efficiency when orchestrated from a centralized node. 
Implications for the Master Tenet and for the Future of Command and Control  
Various authors have proposed revisions to the doctrinal tenet of centralized 
control, decentralized execution, primarily in recognition of confusion regarding the 
meaning of control and the recognition of advanced threats to centralized command 
nodes.  Hinote (2009) argued that the Air Force doctrinal master tenet would be better 
stated, in abbreviated form, as “centralized command and control at the strategic and 
operational levels of war, decentralized execution at the tactical level” (p. 57).  Betts 
(2014) and Marzolf (2009), whose theses are largely focused on concerns about resilience 
of the command and control architecture, argued a more appropriate synopsis of the 
      70 
 
doctrinal tenet would read “centralized command, adaptive control, decentralized 
execution” (Betts, p. 20; Marzolf, p. 37).  Hostage and Broadwell (2014) argued for 
adopting the concept of “centralized command, distributed control, decentralized 
execution” (p. 38).  Whether or not there is actual change to the words in doctrine, there 
is clearly recognition that the command and control of airpower must evolve to meet 
modern challenges to remain an asymmetric advantage in future conflicts. 
The trend in airpower C2 can be characterized as a trend in the general direction 
of greater integration, and potentially greater centralization.  Each of the military services 
is currently engaged in developing capabilities to increase C2 integration to achieve 
multi-domain command and control.  The Air Force, for example, has undertaken a major 
effort to increase operational agility and integrate capabilities in and through the air, 
space, and cyberspace domains (Bruza & Reith, 2018; Hirsch, 2018; Reilly, 2016).  The 
Army and Marines have teamed up to develop an emerging construct termed Multi-
Domain Battle (U.S. Army, 2017).  These efforts are on the heels of an Air Force-Navy 
led effort termed Air-Sea Battle, now labeled Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global 
Commons (Hutchens, Dries, Perdew, Bryant, & Moores, 2017).  All the military services 
are developing technologies and processes that would create capabilities for greater 
integration across domains and across components, to create multiple dilemmas for an 
adversary.  Yet these highly effective, centralized capabilities could be impacted by a 
forced decentralization of C2 through the actions of a near-peer adversary (Hostage & 
Broadwell, 2014).  
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Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature regarding the trade-offs between 
centralized and decentralized command and control of airpower.  The debate regarding 
the appropriate degree of centralization dates to the earliest days of the military 
application of airpower.  Because of its limited capabilities, airpower was initially 
regarded as an auxiliary of ground and naval forces, enhancing existing capabilities of 
communications, reconnaissance, and fire support.  As the capabilities of airpower 
increased, advocates began to argue for treating airpower as co-equal to ground forces, 
and even as a force that could achieve strategic effects independent of surface forces 
more quickly and will reduce cost to friendly forces.  After the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation, the designation of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) has 
become the norm rather than the exception.   
Commanders have several options available to decentralize C2 should conditions 
warrant.  Control can be distributed through existing JFACC control nodes, such as the 
Air Support Operations Centers and the Wing Operations Centers, provided these nodes 
are properly equipped and provided with sufficient numbers of trained personnel.  
Subordinate joint task forces could be provided with their own JFACCs, along with 
appropriate C2 systems to plan, task, and execute air operations.  Another option, 
hearkening back to the much-maligned route package system used in Vietnam, would be 
to operate as service components, with each military service orchestrating its own air 
operations, presumably deconflicted through time or space. 
Under any of these decentralization options there would be a difference between 
their effectiveness in commanding airpower compared to operating under a more 
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centralized control construct.  This difference will be affected by operational conditions, 
including geographic separation between operating areas, the number and capability of 
the assigned assets, and the capabilities of the subordinate nodes and their assigned and 
attached forces.  The next chapter will address the methodology to be used in this study 
to compare centralized and decentralized control under these three operational conditions. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
“If you don't know where you’re going, you'll end up someplace else”  
Yogi Berra (Berra, 1998, p. 132) 
 
The key research question addressed by this study is: from a baseline of 
centralized C2, what is the impact on airpower effectiveness when airpower C2 is 
decentralized, and how is this difference between the two types of C2 impacted by 
changes in three operational conditions?  The dependent variable in the analysis was the 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control.  There were two independent variables: the operational condition and the 
scenario complexity.  Three operational conditions were analyzed at multiple levels: the 
difference in the geographic range of Blue assets, the quantity and quality of Blue assets, 
and the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node.  The hypotheses were assessed under 
both an uncontested and contested scenario.  This study used an experimental research 
design employing wargame modeling to quantitatively assess the impact of these factors 
on the dependent variable.   
Research Approach 
The research employed the JAEX wargaming model to generate the outcomes for 
subsequent analysis.  As noted by Simpson (2015), “C2 modeling to understand complex 
systems provides one more arrow in the quiver to evaluate operational C2 as compared to 
actual warfare, historical studies, or field experiments” (p. 184).  Davidson and Pogel 
(2010) argued that models and simulations offer a “cost-effective method for exploring 
issues within the C2 domain” (p. 1).  They described two types of C2 models: one type 
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explicitly models the C2 functions, while the other type provides force effectiveness as an 
output without modeling all the internal C2 functions.  JAEX fits the description of the 
latter type of model, labeled “ITFE,” (Davidson & Pogel, p. 2).   
The study tested the impacts that varying each of three operational conditions had 
on the mean difference in outcomes between centralized and decentralized control, as 
measured by the attrition-based JAEX model.  Under centralized control, Blue assets 
could reach Red targets in all three sectors, subject to their inherent aircraft range 
limitations.  Under decentralized control, Blue assets were restricted to the respective 
North, Central, or South geographic segments, as depicted in Figure 5.  The asymmetric 
distribution of Red target values in each sector created the potential for differentiation 
between JAEX outcomes conducted under Blue centralized control and those conducted 
under decentralized control.  The Red side operated in decentralized mode for all test 
points, so the variations in outcomes were attributable to changes in the C2 mode on the 
Blue side.  The resulting difference between mean centralized outcomes and mean 
decentralized outcomes constituted the dependent variable for this research.   
As discussed in Appendix A, each JAEX run produces an attrition-based 
numerical result based on opponent’s assets damaged or destroyed.  Each asset, including 
aircraft and targets, is assigned a numeric value; each side gains points by damaging or 
destroying adversary assets.  Positive results reflect a Blue advantage.  Figure 16 depicts 
histograms of notional centralized and decentralized JAEX outcome distributions.  The 
horizontal axis represents the JAEX outcome values.  The outcomes were grouped in 
intervals of 100, and the vertical axis represents the number of JAEX runs that produced 
an outcome within that range.  For example, the tallest blue-green bar shows that there 
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were 77 JAEX runs under decentralized control that produced an outcome of between 
7,000 and 7,100.   
 
 
Figure 16.  Comparing histograms of notional JAEX outcomes.   
 
An important property of subtracting normal distributions, as described in 
Appendix B, states that the distribution of differences between two normal distributions 
is itself normally distributed.  Thus, computing the mathematical difference between the 
outcomes under the normally distributed centralized control and the outcomes under the 
normally distributed decentralized control should theoretically generate a mean 
difference distribution that is also normally distributed.  Chapter IV includes a discussion 
for each experiment in which the theoretical mean and variance for the difference 
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control 
are compared to the experimentally obtained values for the mean and variance.  This 
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property of normal distributions enabled statistical comparison of the mean difference 
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control 
using ANOVA tests for equality of means which require normally distributed 
populations.   
Design and Procedures  
 The research analyzed hypotheses regarding centralized and decentralized control 
under three operational conditions: the impact of geographic separation between 
operational sectors, the impact of changing the quantity and capability of Blue assets, and 
the impact of degrading the capability of the Blue centralized C2 node.  The operational 
conditions are addressed individually in subsequent sections of this chapter.  The 
experiments included analysis of each of the operational conditions under two levels of 
scenario complexity: uncontested and contested, described in more detail below.  Each 
run of the JAEX model generated a numerical outcome score as described in Appendix 
A.  For each level of operational condition and scenario complexity, the JAEX model 
executed 1,000 runs under centralized control, in which any Blue aircraft could strike any 
Red target within range, and under decentralized control, in which Blue aircraft could 
only strike targets within their respective sector.  Subtracting the 1,000 decentralized 
outcomes from the 1,000 centralized outcomes produced the distribution of the study’s 
dependent variable, the outcome difference.  To demonstrate some robustness of the 
results under different levels of scenario complexity, each experiment was conducted 
using scenarios of differing complexities, described as uncontested and contested. 
Uncontested scenario.  In the uncontested scenario, Blue conducted strikes 
against undefended Red targets.  The real-world analog involves an adversary incapable 
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of mounting an effective active defense against the Blue air operation, due to military 
incapacity, surprise, or some other factor.  The Blue side operated from three airbases, 
one in each of its C2 sectors, each of which generated a specified number of strike sorties 
for each of the three turns of the model’s play.  The JAEX model’s algorithms paired the 
Blue strike aircraft against the highest Red priority targets within range.  The baseline 
geographic layout used in this research is shown in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17.  JAEX uncontested scenario depiction.  This figure depicts the three Blue 
bases and the Red target set used in the uncontested scenario. 
 
 Contested scenario.  The more complex contested scenario involved adding 
assets and missions to both Blue and Red sides, enabling Red to defend against the Blue 
attacks.  In addition to its strike aircraft, the Blue side could generate 12 air-to-air 
offensive counterair (OCA) fighter sweep sorties, six suppression of air defense (SEAD) 
sorties, and six air-to-air defensive counterair (DCA) sorties per turn.  The Red side was 
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provided a surface-to-air missile battery defending a high-value target, six air-to-air 
aircraft for DCA missions to defend its airspace, and six air-to-ground aircraft for strike 
missions.   
In JAEX, each aircraft is assigned a proficiency rating which serves as a 
composite of aircrew and aircraft capabilities.  The proficiency ratings range from “F” 
(low proficiency) to “A” (high proficiency).  Except as noted below, the Blue aircraft 
were programmed at the “C” level of proficiency, while their Red counterparts were 
assigned an “E” rating, reflecting an assessed Blue advantage in aircrew training and 
aircraft capability.  The JAEX geographic layout used for the contested scenario is shown 
in Figure 18.   
 
 
Figure 18.  JAEX contested scenario depiction.  This figure depicts the three Blue bases 
and the Red target set used in the uncontested scenario. 
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The experiment assessed the three operational conditions under both the 
uncontested and contested conditions.  The following sections describe in more detail the 
research questions, the hypotheses, and the research designs for each of the operational 
conditions. 
Range constraints on Blue aircraft.  The first specific research question 
addressed is:  
RQ1: What is the effect of increasing the proportion of Blue air assets that is 
range-limited (restricted to the geographic sector in which they are based) on the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control?   
This operational condition reflects range limitations of the assets employed on the 
Blue side, or, equivalently, the effect of increasing the geographic separation between the 
sectors on the Red side.  This range-limiting condition increasingly restricts Blue’s ability 
to shift the air effort to other sectors to strike high-priority targets.   
For the baseline operational condition, termed near, all the Blue aircraft could 
range the entire Red target set without restriction.  Under the midrange operational 
condition, one-half of the Blue aircraft were restricted to the same sector as their launch 
base.  Finally, in the far condition, all Blue aircraft were restricted to attacking Red 
targets in their own sector.  Each of these treatments was examined under the uncontested 
and contested scenario complexity factors using the experimental design in Table 1. 
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Table 1       
Experimental Design for H1, Geographic Separation 
 
       Scenario 
      Condition 
Uncontested Contested 
 
Near XC11 , XD11 XC12 , XD12 
Midrange XC21 , XD21 XC22 , XD22 
Far XC31 , XD31 XC32 , XD32 
 
If XC11 is the outcome of centralized control in column 1, row 1 of Table 1, and 
XD11 is the corresponding outcome under decentralized control, and both are normally 
distributed, then their outcome difference (XCD11 = XC11- XD11) will also be normally 
distributed, per Appendix B.  The outcome difference distributions were assessed for 
near-normality as a condition of performing subsequent parametric statistical testing.  If 
µCDnm represents the mean of the distribution of the difference between the outcomes 
under centralized and decentralized control in row n, column m (for n=1, 2, 3; m=1, 2) of 
Table 2 (XCnm – XDnm), then the first alternative hypotheses assert that as the proportion 
of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios: 
H1: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32       
The associated null hypotheses are that as the proportion of assets that can operate 
outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under 
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or 
increase, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios: 
H10:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31   and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32      
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Quantity and capability of Blue aircraft.  The second research question is 
divided into two subparts, one focused on the number of Blue assets, the other on the 
capability of Blue assets.  The first subpart of this research question is: 
RQ2a: What is the effect of increasing the number of available Blue assets on the 
mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control? 
To address this research question, the JAEX model generated Blue strike aircraft 
at three levels: the baseline inventory, 1.5 times the baseline inventory, and 2.0 times the 
baseline inventory.  Each experiment included examination under the two treatments of 
the scenario complexity factor, uncontested and contested, using the design in Table 2. 
 
Table 2       
Experimental Design for H2a, Increasing Quantity of Blue Aircraft 
 
   Scenario 
Condition 
Uncontested Contested 
 
Baseline inventory XC11 , XD11 XC12 , XD12 
Baseline * 1.5 XC21 , XD21 XC22 , XD22 
Baseline *2.0 XC31 , XD31 XC32 , XD32 
 
 
The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the quantity of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios:   
H2a: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31      and   µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32       
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The corresponding null hypotheses are that as the number of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios: 
H2a0:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31      and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32       
The second subpart of this research question is: 
RQ2b: What is the effect of increasing the capability of the Blue assets on the 
mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control?   
To address RQ2b, focused on aircraft capability, the previously described JAEX 
proficiency rating served as the independent variable.  The proficiency ratings for the 
Blue aircraft were modeled in JAEX at levels “E,” “C,” and “A,” in both the uncontested 
and contested scenario complexity levels, as shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3       
Experimental Design for H2b, Increasing Capability of Blue Assets 
 
                Scenario 
Condition 
Uncontested Contested 
 
Low Proficiency (“E”) XC11 , XD11 XC12 , XD12 
Medium Proficiency (“C”) XC21 , XD21 XC22 , XD22 
High Proficiency (“A”) XC31 , XD31 XC32 , XD32 
 
 
The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the capability of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
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under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios: 
H2b: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31      and   µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32       
The corresponding null hypotheses for H2b are that as the capability of Blue 
assets is increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the 
contested and uncontested scenarios:   
H2b0:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31      and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32       
Degradation of centralized C2 node.  The third and final research question 
analyzes the impact of degrading the effectiveness of the centralized Blue C2 node.  In an 
operational scenario, this situation could be the result of Red air strikes, Red attacks using 
cyberspace or directed energy weapons, or non-hostile causes such as a power outages or 
natural disasters.   
RQ3: What is the effect of degrading the capability of the Blue centralized C2 
node on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control? 
For the purposes of this research, the Blue decentralized nodes retained their full 
capabilities while the central node was degraded.  In a real-world scenario, this 
robustness of decentralized nodes could be attributed to proximity to their forces or to 
their use of alternate, more resilient communications links.  JAEX modeled the 
degradation of the centralized node at four levels: full capacity (100%), slightly degraded 
(80%), moderately degraded (60%), and severely degraded (40%).  The experiment 
      84 
 
included examination under the two treatments of the scenario complexity factor, 
uncontested and contested, using the design depicted in Table 4.   
 
Table 4       
Experimental Design for H3, Degradation of Centralized C2 Node 
 
 
 
The associated alternative hypotheses are that as the Blue centralized node 
becomes increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the 
uncontested and contested scenarios: 
H3:    µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 > µCD41   and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32 > µCD42    
The corresponding null hypotheses are as the capability of the Blue centralized C2 
node is increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both 
the contested and uncontested scenarios:   
H30:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 ≤ µCD41 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32 ≤ µCD42    
 
 
 
Condition 
Uncontested Contested 
 
Fully Capable XC11 , XD11 XC12 , XD12 
Slight Degradation (80%) XC21 , XD21 XC22 , XD22 
Moderate Degradation (60%) XC31 , XD31 XC32 , XD32 
Severe Degradation (40%) XC41 , XD41 XC42 , XD42 
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Instrument Reliability 
Field (2009) defines reliability as “the ability of a measure to produce consistent 
results when the same entities are measured under different conditions” (pp. 792-793).  
Using archery as an analogy, reliability would correspond to the grouping of arrows on 
the target.  Arrows clustered close together (irrespective of their distance from the 
bullseye) would indicate high reliability.  In this study, the JAEX model’s reliability was 
demonstrated through camparing the distribution of the results of multiple runs of this 
stochastic model against the expectation that these results would be approximately 
normally distributed.   
Instrument Validity 
Field (2009) defines validity as “evidence that a study allows correct inferences 
about the question it was aimed to answer” (p. 795).  Using the archery analogy, high 
validity would correspond to arrows landing close to the bulleye.  Since the precise 
location of the true bullseye is not generally known in many studies, validity tends to be a 
challenging construct to measure, and there are a variety of different approaches to 
assessing validity of a study or a test.  The bullseye for the present research was 
particulary challenging to identify; the true distribution for warfighting results is 
generally unknown and, in fact, is indeterminate.  Rather than focusing on specific 
outcomes, as articulated in Chapter I, the present research proceeded on the assumption 
that relative differences in model outcomes reflected relative differences in real-world 
outcomes.  Several validity challenges were addressed in this exploratory design, 
including ecological validity, face validity, and external validity.  
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Ecological validity relates to the bias that could be caused by the researcher’s 
presence (Field, 2009, p. 12).  For this study, an unbiased third-party John Tiller Software 
associate assisted in executing the JAEX runs and recording the data, ensuring that the 
researcher’s personal involvement did not influence the JAEX outcomes. 
Babbie describes face validity as the quality of an indicator that makes it seem to 
be a reasonable measure of some variable of interest (2013, p. 151).  No wargaming 
model can claim to be able to predict the outcome of a conflict with a high degree of 
accuracy, but the JAEX model has been used under an Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research contract for the purposes of education and experimental research.  For this 
study, the results of H1 can be assessed to establish a level of confidence in the trends 
associated with the outcome difference between centralized control and decentralized 
control outcomes, since under the far condition there should be minimal difference 
between the two outcomes. 
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) define external validity as “… whether the 
cause-effect relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, 
and measurement variable” (p. 38).  External validity is a by-product of the quality of the 
research design and by the robustness of the statistical tools used in the analysis.  For the 
given scenarios, this exploratory research assessed the impact of certain operational 
scenarios on the decentralization of airpower C2.  As will be discussed in Chapter V, the 
present research provides opportunities for further research under other scenarios.   
Treatment of the Data 
Each combination of type of control, operational condition, and scenario 
complexity generated 1,000 data points in JAEX.  These data were captured in an Excel® 
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database and downloaded into the IBM SPSS® version 25 Statistical Package for 
analysis. 
Descriptive statistics.  The JAEX output data is synopsized in table form for each 
of the three hypotheses, identifying the type of control, operational condition level, 
scenario complexity level, mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range.  
Another table is used to display the outcome difference descriptive statistics, including 
the mean and standard deviation for comparison with the theoretical mean and standard 
deviation based on the theorem at Appendix B.  The table also displays SPSS 
computations of the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval for the mean 
outcome difference. 
Hypotheses testing.  This research effort leveraged Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) statistical test techniques using IBM’s SPSS to aid in assessing the four pairs 
of null hypotheses.  ANOVA is a mathematical tool used to determine whether there are 
statistically significant differences between the means of three or more independent 
groups (Laerd, 2016).  The ANOVA procedure estimates the likelihood of the given 
results given that the null hypothesis is true.  In general, smaller variances in the 
distributions enable greater discrimination between the means, hence the nomenclature 
Analysis of Variance.  An ANOVA result with p less than .05 indicates there is a less 
than 1-in-20 chance of obtaining the given results, if in fact the null hypothesis were true; 
therefore, the null hypotheses would be rejected.  For this research, it was not sufficient 
that the means are merely different since the hypotheses are directional, so the alternative 
hypotheses means must decrease monotonically to reject the null hypotheses. 
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The research effort employed the ANOVA techniques available in SPSS to assess 
the hypotheses identified H1, H2a, H2b, and H3.  Before conducting the ANOVAs, SPSS 
generated partial boxplots of the data to enable a visual sense of the data, as 
recommended by De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, p. 752).  The partial boxplots 
were based on a one-way ANOVA on the operational condition, providing a picture of 
the differences in responses after removing the effects of the scenario complexity.   
The ANOVA test requires satisfaction of six assumptions (De Veaux et al., 2012; 
Laerd, 2016); for this research effort the first three assumptions were satisfied for all 
hypotheses based on the model and research design:   
1.  The dependent variable must be continuous (either interval or ratio).  JAEX 
outcomes are generated in the form of real numbers on a continuous scale. 
2.  The independent variables (IVs) should consist of categorical, independent 
groups.  In the present research, for each of the hypothesis, the IVs were categorical (e.g., 
operational conditions in H1 were near, midrange, and far, and for all hypotheses the 
scenario complexity levels were either uncontested or contested).   
3.  The observations should be independent, implying that there is no relationship 
between the observations in each group or between the groups themselves.  Within the 
groups, each JAEX stochastically generated result is independent; the result in any 
particular run of the model has no influence on other outcomes. 
The remaining three assumptions required verification after data generation: 
4.  There should be no significant outliers.  Presence of outliers in the generated 
data was assessed graphically using boxplots generated with SPSS.  The SPSS boxplots 
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depict any data points over three-box-lengths away from the mean as an asterisk, 
facilitating detection of any extreme outliers.   
5.  The dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed, meeting 
the required nearly normal condition as described in De Veaux et al. (2012, pp. 728-729).  
The outcome differences between the 1,000 runs of JAEX under centralized control and 
those under decentralized control, each of which were normally distributed, should have 
been, in theory, normally distributed, per the discussion at Appendix B.  Assessment of 
the near-normal assumption includes graphical assessment of the histogram and 
probability-probability (P-P) plots generated in SPSS, and reference to the Shapiro-Wilk 
test in SPSS®.  Because the latter test is sensitive to minor deviations from the normal 
distribution in large sample sizes (Field, 2009, p. 148), the assumption was assumed to 
have been met given that two of these three methods supported the near-normality 
assessment (Laerd, 2016). 
6.  The variances for each combination of groups of the two independent variables 
should be homogeneous.  Homogeneity of variance was assessed graphically using 
clustered boxplots in SPSS and using Hartley’s Fmax test, which required that the greatest 
variance be no more than three times greater than that of the least variance of the 
distributions being tested in the ANOVA (Field, 2009, p. 151; Laerd Statistics, 2016).   
The research design includes two factors: the operational condition and scenario 
complexity.  The intent of this design was to determine if the alternative hypotheses were 
resilient under two different types of scenarios.  A two-way ANOVA, under appropriate 
conditions, provides an assessment of the effects of two independent categorical factors 
on a dependent variable (Laerd, 2017).  In this research, the operational condition and the 
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scenario complexity served as the independent categorical factors, while the outcome 
difference was the dependent variable.  For a detailed discussion of the ANOVA 
statistical techniques, see De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, Chapters 28 and 29), 
Field (2009, Chapter 10), Laerd (2016) and Laerd (2017).   
In the event that the homogeneity of variance requirement is not satisfied, as will 
be seen to be the case in Chapter IV, Laerd suggests conducting two one-way ANOVAs 
as an acceptable alternative to the two-way ANOVA (Laerd, 2017).  This approach loses 
some power for small sample sizes, since the two-way ANOVA takes advantage of 
pooling of error terms, but for this research, sample size was not an issue.  To retain the 
overall probability of Type I error at .05, when conducting two one-way ANOVAs, the 
value of p was set at .025.   
The reporting of the statistical tests in Chapter IV includes the values of F(df1, 
df2), p, and η2, where p is the significance level, and η2 is the estimate of the effect size in 
the sample.  As a reference, Field (2009) notes that η2 values of .01, .06, and .14 represent 
small, medium, and large effects respectively (p. 389-390).  The statistical test reporting 
also includes results of post-hoc analyses and the observed power of the tests.   
Summary 
This research focuses on three hypotheses regarding decentralization of command 
and control, derived from work by previous researchers, including Hinote (2009), Hukill 
et al. (2012), and Betts (2014).  This research effort employs the JAEX airpower model to 
evaluate three basic hypotheses: the impact of geographic separation, the impact of 
changing the quantity or quality of Blue assets, and the impact of degrading the capability 
of the Blue centralized C2 node.  The analysis evaluated each hypothesis under scenarios 
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of differing complexity, uncontested and contested.  The operational condition and 
scenario complexity are the categorical independent variables in the study, and difference 
in outcomes under centralized and decentralized control is the dependent variable.  After 
verifying the appropriate assumptions for the statistical tests, the research leveraged the 
IBM SPSS® Statistics ANOVA feature to assess the change in mean outcome 
differences.  The JAEX model outcomes and the analysis of the data are reported in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
“This game is 90% mental.  The other half is physical” (Yogi Berra, 1998, p. 89) 
 
The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of 
decentralizing the command and control of airpower under varying operational 
conditions.  The results of the analyses are presented incrementally, addressing each of 
the hypotheses associated with the three operational conditions.  Each section includes 
descriptive statistics, assessment of the parametric test assumptions, and the hypothesis 
test results.   
Data Generation and Preparation 
For each of the hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, and H3), the analyses required 
construction of JAEX software scenario files for each combination of the independent 
variables: operational condition level (which varied by hypothesis), scenario complexity 
level (uncontested or contested), and type of control (centralized or decentralized).  The 
model executed 1,000 iterations for each of the resulting 46 scenario files, with the 
outcome results placed into Excel® worksheets for importation into IBM’s SPSS® 
Version 25 statistical software package.   
The dependent variable of interest was the outcome difference, defined as the 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control.  The outcome difference is a continuous ratio variable (Field, 2009, p. 9); SPSS 
computed this outcome difference for each level of each operational condition by 
subtracting the decentralized outcome values from the corresponding centralized 
outcomes, creating 1,000 outcome difference values for each operational condition.   
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Valid ANOVA statistical tests require satisfaction of the assumptions outlined at 
the end of the previous chapter (Laerd, 2018; De Veaux et al., 2012).  Each section below 
contains a discussion of the assumptions requiring analysis of the experimental data to 
confirm. 
Hypothesis 1: Geographic Separation   
Hypothesis 1 in the study asserts that as the proportion of Blue assets that can 
operate outside their assigned sector decreases (equivalently, that the increased separation 
of geographic sectors limits a greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they 
are based), the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control decreases.  The associated null hypothesis is as the 
proportion of assets that can operate outside their assigned sector decreases, there is no 
significant change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
and outcomes under decentralized control.  To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model 
conducted 1,000 runs for each combination of the two types of control (centralized, 
decentralized), three operational condition levels (near, mid, far), and two scenario 
complexity levels (uncontested, contested).   
Descriptive statistics.  The 12,000 model runs yielded 6,000 outcome difference 
values, derived by subtracting the decentralized outcomes from the centralized outcomes.  
Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range for each 
combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario and condition.  
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Table 5 
H1 JAEX Outcomes 
Scenario 
Complexity 
Operational 
 Condition 
Type of Control M (SD) Min. Max. Range 
Uncontested Near Centralized 27436(1211) 23021 31263 8242 
Uncontested Near Decentralized 21837(1041) 18123 25169 7046 
Uncontested Mid Centralized 26314(1025) 23230 30982 7752 
Uncontested Mid Decentralized 21837(1041) 18490 24793 6303 
Uncontested Far Centralized 21812(1076) 18295 25167 6872 
Uncontested Far Decentralized 21815(1040) 18391 24524 6133 
Contested Near Centralized 21879(3842) 6874 29759 22885 
Contested Near Decentralized 14645(4738) 1873 24710 22837 
Contested Mid Centralized 19665(3966) 7323 28218 20895 
Contested Mid Decentralized 14634(4701) 2166 23367 21201 
Contested Far Centralized 14679(4607) 2386 23240 20854 
Contested Far Decentralized 14624(4668) 2323 24112 21789 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
As discussed in Appendix A, each JAEX run produces an attrition-based 
numerical result based on opponent’s assets damaged or destroyed.  As an example, the 
first line of Table 5 indicates that 1,000 runs of the JAEX model using centralized control 
under uncontested conditions produced a mean Blue advantage of 27,436 points.  The 
results are approximately normally distributed, so the standard deviation is indicative of 
the range, plus or minus the mean, into which 58% of the results fell.  Under contested 
conditions, the mean Blue advantage decreased, due to Red defensive efforts, while the 
standard deviation increased, reflective of the greater number of aircraft and targets and 
hence the number of stochastic events associated with each run of the model.   
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The difference between the 1,000 pairs of runs under centralized and 
decentralized control yielded a numeric outcome difference for each run.  Table 6 shows 
the mean and standard deviation of the outcome difference values produced under the 
uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition levels of 
near, mid, and far.  The theoretical outcome difference column in each table shows the 
mean and standard deviation predicted by the theory of combining normal distributions as 
described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows the mean and 
standard deviation of the distribution of outcome differences for the 1,000 centralized and 
decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 5.  As seen from the data in 
Table 6, the actual outcome difference means and standard deviations agreed closely with 
those of the theoretical outcome difference.  The variances in Table 6 have been divided 
by 103 for ease of display; as will be seen later, the divergence in the variances between 
uncontested and contested scenarios created challenges in the planned two-way 
ANOVAs.  Table 6 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the 
six outcome difference distributions.  Figure 19 graphically depicts each of the means, 
along with their 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 6 
H1 Outcome Differences 
Scenario 
Operational 
   Condition 
Theoretical 
Outcome 
Difference 
M (SD) 
Actual 
Outcome 
Difference 
M (SD) 
Variance 
 (x10-3) 
95% CI 
for mean 
lower 
bound 
95% CI 
for mean 
upper 
bound 
Uncontested Near 5599(1597) 5599(1577) 2487 5501 5696 
Uncontested Mid 4477(1567) 4477(1564) 2446 4380 4574 
Uncontested Far -3(1496) -3(1515) 2295 -97 91 
Contested Near 7234(6100) 7234(6212) 38589 6849 7620 
Contested Mid 5031(6150) 5031(6213) 38601 4650 5413 
Contested Far 55(6559) 54(6517) 42471 -350 458 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Clustered error bar mean chart for H1 outcome differences.  
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Hypothesis testing for H1.  The ANOVA tests were designed to determine if 
there is significant difference between the mean outcome differences at each operational 
condition level.  Experiments were conducted with the geographic sectors set at near, 
mid, and far.  H1 asserts that as the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside 
their assigned sector decreases (equivalently, that the increased separation of geographic 
sectors limits a greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they are based), 
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control decreases monotonically in both the contested and uncontested 
scenarios:   
H1: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31    and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32     
The associated null hypotheses are that as the proportion of assets that can operate 
outside their assigned sector decreases, the mean difference between outcomes under 
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or 
increase, in both the uncontested and contested scenarios: 
H10:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31   and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32      
A two-way between-subjects ANOVA was planned to identify the significance of 
the decrease in the mean outcome difference as the operational condition transitioned 
from near, to midrange, to far, under both levels of scenario complexity.  The next 
section discusses the test assumptions and the results of the testing for H1. 
ANOVA test assumptions.  The experimental structure validated the first three of 
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that 
relied on results from the data.  For the near-normality assumption, Figures C1-C12 at 
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference 
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data.  These graphs support the assertion that the data satisfied the requirement for near 
normality; in addition, each of the outcome difference distributions met the requirements 
of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (p > .05).   
Figure 20 displays the clustered boxplots for the H1 data.  While there were some 
data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the edge of their box (indicated by circular 
dots, along with their respective JAEX run number), there were no three-box-length 
extreme outliers, which would have been indicated by an asterisk.   
 
 
Figure 20.  Clustered boxplot chart of H1 outcome differences.  
 
The analysis considered two methodologies for assessing the requirement for 
homogeneity of variance.  First, the ratio of the largest variance (contested far) to 
smallest variance (uncontested far) was 18.5, considerably exceeding the Hartley Fmax 
limit of 3.0 (Field, 2009, p. 151).  Second, De Veaux et al. (2012) recommend using a 
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graphical assessment of the residuals to assess this assumption, arguing that if the 
variance is constant, the plot should be patternless (p. 757).  Figure 21 shows a scatterplot 
of the residuals of the six outcome difference distributions; it is evident that the 
distribution of residuals was distinctly different for the uncontested scenario outcomes 
compared to the contested outcomes.   
 
 
 
Figure 21.  Scatterplot of outcome difference residuals versus predicted residuals.  
 
The significant heterogeneity of variances, in which the variances of the outcome 
difference distribution in the contested scenarios was significantly larger than that of the 
uncontested scenarios, posed an impediment to the planned two-way ANOVA 
procedures.  In retrospect, since the uncontested and contested scenarios involved a 
different mix of Blue and Red assets, it should not have been surprising that their 
outcome differences would not be directly comparable.  The challenge posed by the 
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heterogeneity of variance obtained in the two different levels of scenario complexity will 
be more fully addressed in the next chapter. 
The violation of the requirement for homogeneity of variance necessitated an 
alternative approach to the planned two-way ANOVA for statistical analysis.  In lieu of 
conducting a two-way ANOVA when the homogeneity of variance requirement is 
violated, Laerd (2018, p. 14) recommends that separate one-way ANOVAs can be 
conducted if the interaction plots are ordinal (that is, their lines do not cross), as is case 
with the data in Figure 22.  To keep the overall Type I error rate at .05 for the two one-
way ANOVAs, the alpha for each of the one-way ANOVAs was set at 1 – .952 = .025 
(Laerd, 2018, p. 15).  The remainder of this section will discuss the one-way ANOVAs 
for each level of scenario complexity. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Profile plots for H1 outcome differences. 
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Uncontested scenario ANOVA.  The data met the requirements for near-
normality and no outliers, as shown in the above section.  The data demonstrated no 
violation of the homogeneity of variances requirement, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax 
value of 1.08, which was less than the upper limit of 3.0, and by Levene's test for equality 
of variances (p = .574).  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome difference was found to be 
statistically significant for different levels of operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 3646.5, 
p < .001, η2 = .709.  The observed power of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc 
analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  
Details regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
H1 Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
   Condition 
Operational 
         Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
 97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
Near 
Mid 
Far 
1122 
5601 
.000 
.000 
941 
5421 
 
1303 
5782 
Mid 
Near 
Far 
-1122 
4480 
.000 
.000 
-1303 
4299 
 -941 
4661 
Far 
Near 
Mid 
-5601 
-4480 
.000 
.000 
-5782 
-4661 
 -5421 
-4299 
       
Note: Std Error = 69.4 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
Contested scenario ANOVA.  The data met the requirements for near-normality 
and no outliers.  The data demonstrated no violation of the requirement for homogeneity 
of variances within the contested scenario complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley 
Fmax value of 1.10, and by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = .304).  Per the 
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ANOVA, the mean outcome difference was statistically significant for different levels of 
operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 341.5, p < .001, and η2 = .186.  The observed power 
of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise 
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details regarding the post-hoc 
analysis are provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
H1 Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
   Condition 
Operational 
         Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
95% CI  
upper 
bound 
Near 
Mid 
Far 
2203 
7180 
.000 
.000 
1469 
6447 
2936 
7913 
Mid 
Near 
Far 
-2203 
4977 
.000 
.000 
-2936 
4244 
-1469 
5711 
Far 
Near 
Mid 
-7180 
-4977 
.000 
.000 
-7913 
-5710 
-6447 
-4244 
      
Note: Std Error = 281.5 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
H1 summary.  The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested 
scenarios under H1 were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.  
Thus, as the proportion of Blue assets that can operate outside their assigned sector 
decreased (equivalently, that the increased separation of geographic sectors limited a 
greater proportion of Blue assets to the sector in which they were based), the difference 
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control 
decreased.   
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Hypothesis 2a: Quantity of Blue Assets   
As discussed in Chapter II, the study’s second hypothesis was split into two 
hypotheses, one focused on increasing the number of Blue assets, the second on 
increasing the capability of Blue assets.  Hypothesis 2a asserts that as the quantity of Blue 
aircraft increases, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control decreases, in both the uncontested and contested 
scenario conditions.  The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no significant 
change in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control as the quantity of Blue assets is increased.  The analysis 
assessed three operational condition levels: the baseline assets (1.0); a 50% increase in 
assets (1.5); and a 100% increase in assets (2.0).  To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model 
conducted 1,000 runs for each combination of the two types of control (centralized, 
decentralized), three operational condition levels (1.0, 1.5, and 2.0), and two scenario 
complexity levels (uncontested, contested).   
Descriptive Statistics.  The 12,000 model runs (1000 of each combination of type 
of control, operational condition, and scenario complexity) yielded 6,000 outcome 
differences.  Table 9 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and 
range for each combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario complexity and operational 
condition.  
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Table 9 
H2a JAEX Outcomes 
Scenario 
Complexity 
Operational 
Condition 
Type of Control M (SD) Min. Max. Range 
Uncontested 1.0 Centralized 36937(1450) 31584 40756 9172 
Uncontested 1.0 Decentralized 21859(1055) 18622 25645 7023 
Uncontested 1.5 Centralized 41220(1469) 36447 46217 9770 
Uncontested 1.5 Decentralized 32779(1243) 29014 36945 7931 
Uncontested 2.0 Centralized 43696(1515) 37960 48969 11009 
Uncontested 2.0 Decentralized 43678(1493) 39011 48103 9092 
Contested 1.0 Centralized 31999(3852) 17205 39702 22497 
Contested 1.0 Decentralized 16744(3895) 3509 24053 20544 
Contested 1.5 Centralized 38872(2454) 27260 45011 17751 
Contested 1.5 Decentralized 30060(2636) 16426 36172 19746 
Contested 2.0 Centralized 41122(2572) 31018 47486 16468 
Contested 2.0 Decentralized 41108(2453) 32830 46782 13952 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
Table 10 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced 
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition 
levels of 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0.  The theoretical outcome difference column in each table 
shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining normal 
distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows 
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for the 
1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the corresponding rows in Table 9.  
As shown in Table 10, the actual outcome difference distribution agreed closely with the 
theoretical outcome difference.  The variances have been divided by 103 for ease of 
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display; once again, the divergence in the variances between uncontested and contested 
scenarios created challenges in the planned two-way ANOVAs.  Table 10 shows the 95% 
confidence intervals for the means of the six outcome difference distributions.  Figure 23 
depicts each of the means, along with their 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 10 
H2a Outcome Differences 
Scenario Operational 
 Condition 
Theoretical 
Outcome  
Difference 
M (SD) 
Actual 
 Outcome 
 Difference 
M (SD) 
Variance 
(x10-3) 
95% CI 
for mean 
lower 
bound 
95% CI 
for mean 
upper 
bound 
Uncontested 1.0 15077(1793) 15078(1808) 3269 14965 15190 
Uncontested 1.5 8442(1924) 8442(1900) 3610 8324 8560 
Uncontested 2.0 18(2127) 18(2127) 4524 -114 150 
Contested 1.0 15255(5478) 15255(5305) 28143 14926 15584 
Contested 1.5 8812(3601) 8812(3602) 12974 8588 9035 
Contested 2.0 14(3554) 14(3507) 12299 -204 231 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
Figure 23.  Clustered error bar mean chart for H2a outcome differences.  
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Hypothesis testing for H2a.  Experiments were conducted with the number of 
Blue assets set at 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0.  H2a asserts that as the quantity of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios:   
H2a: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31      and   µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32       
The corresponding null hypotheses are that as the number of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios: 
H2a0:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31      and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32       
ANOVA test assumptions.  The experimental structure validated the first three of 
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that 
relied on results from the data.  For the near-normality assumption, Figures C13-C24 at 
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference 
data for H2a.  These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for near-normality 
is met.  The outcome difference distributions met the requirements of the Shapiro-Wilk's 
normality test (p > .05), with the exceptions of uncontested 1.0 (p = .036) and contested 
1.5 (p < .001).  Field (2009) notes that Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results from 
small deviations from normality and recommends cross-checking with the histograms and 
P-P plots (p. 144).  In this case, the plots (C13-C14 and C21-C22) do not indicate non-
normality worthy of concern. 
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For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 24 displays the clustered boxplots 
for the H2a data.  While there are some data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from 
the edge of their box (indicated by circular dots, along with their respective JAEX run 
number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been 
indicted by an asterisk.   
For H2a, the data violated the homogeneity of variance requirement for the two-
way ANOVA, as assessed by Levene’s test p < .001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 9.3.  The 
uncontested and contested interaction profile plots at Figure 25 are ordinal; as per the 
rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis proceeded using two one-way 
ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested scenarios, using α = .025 for 
each test.   
 
 
Figure 24.  Clustered boxplot chart of H1 outcome differences. 
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Figure 25.  Profile plots for H2a outcome differences.  
 
 
Uncontested scenario ANOVA.  The data demonstrated no violation of the 
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity 
level, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.2.  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome 
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of 
operational condition, F(2, 2997) = 3646.5, p < .001, η2 = .909.  The observed power of 
the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise 
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details regarding the post-hoc 
analysis are provided in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
H2a Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
6636 
15060 
.000 
.000 
6409 
14833 
6863 
15287 
1.5 
1.0 
2.0 
-6636 
8424 
.000 
.000 
-6863 
8197 
-6409 
8651 
2.0 
1.0 
1.5 
-15060 
-8424 
.000 
.000 
-15287 
-8651 
-14833 
-8197 
      
Note: Std Error = 87.2 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
Contested scenario ANOVA.  The data demonstrated no violation of the 
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario complexity level, 
as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.10.  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome 
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of 
operational condition under the contested scenario,  F(2, 2997) = 341.5, p < .001, η2 = 
.687.  The observed power of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis 
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details 
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
H2a Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
6443 
15241 
.000 
.000 
5952 
14750 
6935 
15733 
1.5 
1.0 
2.0 
-6443 
8798 
.000 
.000 
-6935 
8306 
-5952 
9290 
2.0 
1.0 
1.5 
-15241 
-8798 
.000 
.000 
-15732 
-9290 
-14750 
-8306 
      
Note: Std Error = 188.7 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
H2a summary.  The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested 
scenarios under H2a were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.  
Thus, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreased significantly as the number of Blue assets was 
increased. 
Hypothesis 2b: Capability of Blue Assets   
Hypothesis 2b asserts that as the capability of Blue aircraft increases, the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control will become smaller, under both the uncontested and contested scenario 
conditions.  The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no significant difference 
in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control as the capability of Blue aircraft increases.  For this hypothesis, the 
analysis varied the operational condition levels by adjusting the JAEX quality factor for 
the aircraft.  The three operational condition levels assessed included a basic level of 
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capability (quality E), a moderate capability (quality C), and enhanced capability (quality 
A).  To test this hypothesis, the JAEX model conducted 1,000 runs for each combination 
of the two types of control (centralized, decentralized), three operational condition levels 
(quality-E, quality-C, and quality-A), and two scenario complexity levels (uncontested, 
contested).   
Descriptive statistics.  The 12,000 model runs (1,000 of each combination of 
type of control, operational condition, and scenario complexity) yielded 6,000 outcome 
differences.  Table 13 shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and 
range for each combination of JAEX outcomes for scenario and condition.  
Table 13 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced 
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition 
levels of quality-E, quality-C, and quality-A.  The theoretical outcome difference column 
in each table shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining 
normal distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column 
shows the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for 
the 1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
H2b JAEX Outcomes 
Scenario 
Complexity 
Operational 
Condition 
Type of Control M (SD) Min. Max. Range 
Uncontested Quality-E  Centralized 12388(1368) 7270 17418 10148 
Uncontested Quality-E Decentralized 7311(990) 4123 10242 6119 
Uncontested Quality-C Centralized 18308(1317) 14150 22824 8674 
Uncontested Quality-C Decentralized 14644(1148) 10749 17628 6879 
Uncontested Quality-A Centralized 21887(1011) 18857 25721 6864 
Uncontested Quality-A Decentralized 21797(1108) 18555 25859 7304 
Contested Quality-E Centralized 5005(1925) 1260 11829 10569 
Contested Quality-E Decentralized 1470(811) 91 5973 5882 
Contested Quality-C Centralized 13386(2911) 4167 21786 17619 
Contested Quality-C Decentralized 7039(3343) 1367 16981 15614 
Contested Quality-A Centralized 16790(4007) 3978 23612 19634 
Contested Quality-A Decentralized 16996(4034) 3324 24488 21164 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
As seen from the data in Table 14, the actual outcome difference distribution 
agreed closely with the theoretical outcome difference from the theory.  The variances 
have been divided by 103 for ease of display; the divergence in the variances between 
uncontested and contested scenarios will create challenges in the planned two-way 
ANOVAs.  Table 14 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the 
six outcome difference distributions.  Figure 26 depicts each of the means, along with 
their 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 14 
H2b Outcome Differences 
Scenario 
Operational 
   Condition 
Theoretical 
   Outcome 
Difference    
M (SD) 
Actual 
Outcome 
Difference 
M (SD) 
Variance 
(x10-3) 
95% CI 
for mean 
lower 
bound 
95% CI 
for mean 
upper 
bound 
Uncontested Quality-E 5077(1689) 5077(1648) 2716 4974 5179 
Uncontested Quality-C 3664(1748) 3664(1729) 2989 3557 3771 
Uncontested Quality-A 89(1500) 89(1517) 2301 -5 183 
Contested Quality-E 3535(2089) 3535(2067) 4272 3407 3663 
Contested Quality-C 6347(4433) 6347(4506) 20304 6067 6627 
Contested Quality-A -206(5685) -206(5662) 32058 -557 146 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Clustered error bar mean chart for H2b outcome differences. 
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Hypothesis Testing for H2b.  Experiments were conducted with the capabilty of 
Blue assets set at Quality E, C, and A.  H2b asserts that as the capability of Blue assets is 
increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios: 
H2b: µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31      and   µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32      
The corresponding null hypotheses for H2b are that as the capability of Blue 
assets is increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both the 
contested and uncontested scenarios:   
H2b0:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31      and   µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32       
ANOVA test assumptions.  The experimental structure validated the first three of 
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that 
relied on results from the data.  For the near-normality assumption, Figures C25-C36 at 
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference 
outcome data for H2b.  These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for near-
normality was met with Shapiro-Wilk's normality test (p > .05) with the exceptions of 
contested quality-E (p < .001) and contested quality-C (p < .001).  Field (2009) notes that 
Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results from small deviations from normality and 
recommends cross-checking with the histograms and P-P plots.  In this case, the plots 
(C31-C32 and C33-C34) appeared to meet the near-normality requirement.   
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For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 27 displays the clustered boxplots 
for the H2b data.  Although some data points exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the edge of 
their box, there were no 3-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been indicated 
by an asterisk.   
 
 
 
Figure 27.  Clustered boxplot chart of H2b outcome differences. 
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Figure 28.  Profile plots for H2b outcome differences.  
 
 
Uncontested scenario ANOVA. The data demonstrated no violation of the 
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity 
level, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.3.  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome 
difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels of 
operational condition,  F(2, 2997) = 2475.9, p < .001, η2 = .623.  The observed power of 
the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise 
comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details regarding the post-hoc 
analysis are provided in Table 15. 
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Table 15 
H2b Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
Quality E 
Quality C  
Quality A 
1414 
4987 
.000 
.000 
1222 
4797 
1603 
5178 
Quality C 
Quality E 
Quality A 
-1412 
3575 
.000 
.000 
-1603 
3384 
-1222 
3765 
Quality A 
Quality E  
Quality C 
-4987 
-3575 
.000 
.000 
-5178 
-3765 
-4797 
-3384 
      
Note: Std Error = 73.1 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
Contested scenario ANOVA.  The data violated the requirement for homogeneity 
of variances within the contested scenario complexity level, as assessed by the Hartley 
Fmax value of 7.5.  In lieu of the standard ANOVA, the Welch’s F test was performed, as 
that test is robust under heterogeneity of variance (Field, 2009, p. 380).  The mean 
outcome difference outcome was found to be statistically significant for different levels 
of operational condition under the contested scenario,  F(2, 1677.4) = 412.0, p < .001, η2 
= .276.  The observed power of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis 
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details 
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 16. 
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Table 16 
H2b Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
Quality E 
Quality C  
Quality A 
-2812 
3741 
.000 
.000 
-3318 
3235 
-2302 
4247 
Quality C 
Quality E 
Quality A 
2812 
6553 
.000 
.000 
2306 
6046 
3318 
7059 
Quality A 
Quality E  
Quality C 
-3741 
-6553 
.000 
.000 
-4247 
-7059 
-3235 
-6046 
      
Note: Std Error = 194.3 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
Although the means for H2b are significantly different, these data show that the 
contested scenario outcome difference violated the directional hypothesis for H2b, since 
the mean outcome difference for quality C represented a statistically significantly 
increase over the outcome difference for quality E.  This is contrary to the alternative 
hypothesis that the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and 
outcomes under decentralized control will decrease monotonically as quality of Blue 
assets increases   
The cause of this contrary result can be traced to unforeseen nonlinear impacts of 
changes in capability values.  The mean outcomes for both centralized and decentralized 
control at quality C increased considerably over those at quality E; hence, their mean 
difference also increased.  Using an analogy from sports, consider two football teams that 
have defeated a common opponent with results of 14-0 and 7-0, or a difference of 7 
points.  Increasing the capability of the players on both victorious teams might result in 
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victories over the same opponent of 30-0 and 20-0, respectively.  Although the difference 
in margins of victory, 10 points, represents an increase over the previous difference, on a 
normalized scale, the margin of victory represents a smaller percentage of total points 
scored, 20% versus 33%, respectively.  
The rejection of Hypothesis 2b for the contested scenario generated a search for a 
method to re-express the dependent variable and revise the hypothesis accordingly.  As 
one of several possible methods to normalize the mean outcome differences, the analysis 
proceeded by computing each outcome difference as the advantage of centralized control 
over decentralized control, divided by the overall mean outcome under centralized and 
decentralized control, calculated as a percentage.  For outcomes in which centralized 
control exceeded decentralized control, this percentage was positive; when decentralized 
control outcomes exceeded centralized control, this percentage was negative.  This 
normalization of the data produced 1,000 new data points, each a normalized outcome 
difference, expressed as a percentage.  Subsequent references to the normalization 
technique used in the study will be referred to as the mean centralized outcome 
percentage advantage (or disadvantage) over the mean decentralized outcome. 
The last column of Table 17 depicts the normalized outcome differences.  The 
fourth line of the table shows that for the contested scenario with Blue at quality E, the 
mean centralized outcome percentage advantage over the mean decentralized control’s 
outcome was 109%.  For quality C, although the absolute mean outcome difference 
showed an increase, that mean outcome difference reflected a 62% advantage over the 
mean decentralized outcomes.  Thus, the mean centralized control advantage had 
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diminished from 109% to 62%, even though the absolute difference between centralized 
and decentralized mean outcomes increased. 
 
Table 17 
H2b Normalizing Outcome Differences 
Scenario 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Centralized 
Outcome 
Mean 
Decentralized 
Outcome 
Mean 
Outcome 
Mean 
Outcome 
Difference 
Mean 
Normalized 
Outcome 
Difference 
(Pct) 
Uncontested Quality-E 12388 7311 9850 5077 52% 
Uncontested Quality-C 18308 14644 16476 3664 22% 
Uncontested Quality-A 21887 21797 21842 89 0% 
Contested Quality-E 5005 1470 3238 3535 109% 
Contested Quality-C 13386 7039 10213 6347 62% 
Contested Quality-A 16790 16996 16893 -206 -1% 
Note:  Mean Outcome Difference = Mean Centralized Outcome – Mean Decentralized Outcome 
           Mean Outcome = (Mean Centralized Outcome + Mean Decentralized Outcome) / 2 
     Normalized Outcome Difference (Pct) = [Mean (Outcome Difference / Mean Outcome))] *100 
 
 
This normalized re-expression of the H2b data points (De Veaux et al., 2012, p. 
91) adjusts the outcome difference based on the size of the centralized and decentralized 
outcomes.  The re-expressed data yields the graphs in Figure 29, 30, and 31, which by 
visual inspection, meet the directional requirement of the hypotheses.  The subsequent 
H2b hypothesis testing used the re-expressed data. 
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Figure 29.  Clustered error bar mean chart for H2b normalized outcome difference.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  Clustered boxplot chart of H2b normalized outcome differences. 
      122 
 
 
 
Figure 31.  Profile plots for H2b normalized outcome differences. 
 
H2b ANOVA test assumptions for normalized outcome differences.  For the 
near-normality assumption, Figures C37-C48 at Appendix C show the histograms and P-
P plots obtained from the normalized outcome difference data for H2b.  For the 
uncontested scenario outcomes, the histograms, P-P plots, and Shapiro-Wilk test 
indicated near-normality.  For the contested scenarios, the histogram for quality E (Figure 
C43) demonstrated some right skew issues, but overall the normalized outcome 
difference plots indicated compliance with the near-normal condition requirement.  
For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 31 displays the clustered boxplots 
for the normalized H2b data.  While there were some data points that exceeded 1.5 box 
lengths from the edge of their box (indicated by circular dots along with their respective 
JAEX run number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have 
been indicted by an asterisk.   
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 As was the case with the previous hypotheses, the data violated the requirement 
for homogeneity of variance for the two-way ANOVA, as assessed by Levene’s test p < 
.001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 47.2.  The uncontested and contested interaction profile plots at 
Figure 32 are ordinal; as per the rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis 
proceeded using two one-way ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested 
scenarios, using α = .025 for each test.  
Uncontested scenario ANOVA for normalized H2b.  The normalized data 
exhibited marginal compliance with the requirement for homogeneity of variances within 
the uncontested scenario complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 5.1, 
which is somewhat higher than the recommended upper limit of 3.  Per the ANOVA, the 
mean normalized outcome difference was found to be statistically significant for different 
levels of operational condition under the uncontested scenario,  F(2, 2997) = 4506, p < 
.001, η2 = .760.  The Welch’s F, which is robust under heterogeneity of variance, was 
also statistically significant, F(2,1812) = 4659.7, p < .001.  The observed power of the 
test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons 
were statistically significant, p < .001; details are provided in Table 18. 
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Table 18 
H2b Uncontested Normalized Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
Quality E 
Quality C  
Quality A 
29.3 
51.1 
.000 
.000 
27.9 
49.7 
30.7 
52.5 
Quality C 
Quality E 
Quality A 
-29.3 
21.8 
.000 
.000 
-30.7 
20.4 
-27.9 
23.2 
Quality A 
Quality E  
Quality C 
-51.1 
-21.8 
.000 
.000 
-52.5 
-23.2 
-49.7 
-20.4 
      
Note: Std Error = 0.54 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
Contested scenario ANOVA for normalized H2b.  The normalized data did not 
violate the requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario 
complexity levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.3.  Per the ANOVA, the 
mean normalized outcome difference was found to be statistically significant for different 
levels of operational condition under the contested scenario,  F(2, 2997) = 1289, p < .001, 
η2 = .502.  The observed power of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis 
revealed that all pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details 
regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in Table 19. 
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Table 19 
H2b Contested Normalized Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
Quality E 
Quality C  
Quality A 
47.1 
110.4 
.000 
.000 
41.4 
104.7 
52.7 
116.1 
Quality C 
Quality E 
Quality A 
-47.1 
63.4 
.000 
.000 
-52.7 
57.7 
-41.3 
69.1 
Quality A 
Quality E  
Quality C 
-110.4 
-63.4 
.000 
.000 
-116.1 
-69.1 
-104.7 
-57.7 
      
Note: Std Error = 2.18 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
H2b summary.  The original H2b hypotheses were partly supported.  The null 
hypothesis for the uncontested scenarios under H2b was rejected; however, the 
directional null hypothesis for the contested scenarios could not be rejected.  This 
necessitated an adjustment to the hypotheses, using a normalized outcome difference as 
the dependent variable.  With this revision to the hypothesis, it can be asserted that the 
normalized mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreased significantly as the capability of Blue assets was 
increased. 
Hypothesis 3: Reduction in Centralized C2 Node’s Capability   
Hypothesis 3 asserts that as the centralized node becomes increasingly degraded 
at executing the C2 mission, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control will decrease, in both the uncontested 
and contested scenario conditions.  The associated null hypothesis is that there will be no 
significant difference in the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
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and outcomes under decentralized control as the centralized node becomes less effective.  
The analysis included four operational condition levels: full capacity (100%), slightly 
degraded (80%), moderately degraded (60%), and severely degraded (40%).  The 
hypothesis testing required 10,000 runs of the JAEX model; at each of the two scenario 
complexity levels there were four levels of centralized control, with one decentralized 
level against which they were compared.   
Descriptive statistics.  The 10,000 model runs yielded 5,000 outcome differences 
between centralized and decentralized control outcomes.  Table 20 shows the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and range for each combination of JAEX 
outcomes for scenario and condition.  
 
Table 20 
H3 JAEX Outcomes 
Scenario 
Complexity 
Operational 
Condition 
Type of Control M (SD) Min. Max. Range 
Uncontested 100% Centralized 21777(1052) 17478 25551 8073 
Uncontested 80% Centralized 18238(1116) 14862 22886 8024 
Uncontested 60% Centralized 14534(1102) 10945 18312 7367 
Uncontested 40% Centralized 10920(1090) 7355 15191 7836 
Uncontested 100% Decentralized 14583(1161) 10630 17821 7191 
Contested 100% Centralized 17078(3682) 4038 24785 20747 
Contested 80% Centralized 12711(3729) 2791 20842 18051 
Contested 60% Centralized 8985(3141) 1920 16942 15022 
Contested 40% Centralized 5499(2330) 1204 12035 10831 
Contested 100% Decentralized 7036(3213) 1520 15795 14275 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
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Table 21 shows the mean and standard deviation of the JAEX outcomes produced 
under the uncontested and contested scenarios, respectively, for the operational condition 
levels of 100%, 80%, 60%, and 40%.  The theoretical outcome difference column in each 
table shows the mean and standard deviation predicted by theory of combining normal 
distributions as described in Appendix B; the actual outcome difference column shows 
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the outcome differences for the 
1,000 centralized and decentralized outcomes from the appropriate rows in Table 20.  As 
seen from the data in Table 21, the actual outcome difference distribution agreed closely 
with the theoretical outcome difference from the theory.  The variances have been 
divided by 103 for ease of display; once again the divergence in the variances between 
uncontested and contested scenarios will create challenges in the planned two-way 
ANOVAs.  Table 21 also shows the 95% confidence interval for the mean of each of the 
eight outcome difference distributions.  Figure 32 depicts each of the means, along with 
their 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 21 
H3 Outcome Differences 
Scenario 
Complexity 
Operational 
Condition 
Theoretical 
Outcome 
Difference 
M (SD) 
Actual 
Outcome 
Difference 
M (SD) 
Variance 
(x10-3) 
95% CI 
for mean 
lower 
bound 
95% CI 
for mean 
upper 
bound 
Uncontested 100% 7194(1567) 7194(1568) 2459 7097 9291 
Uncontested 80% 3655(1610) 3655(1579) 2493 3557 3753 
Uncontested 60% -48(1601) -48(1626) 2644 -149 53 
Uncontested 40% -3662(1592) -3662(1553) 2412 -3759 -3566 
Contested 100% 10043(4887) 10043(5009) 25090 9732 10353 
Contested 80% 5675(4923) 5675(4886) 23873 5372 5978 
Contested 60% 1919(4493) 1919(4561) 20803 1636 2202 
Contested 40% -1537(3969) -1537(3993) 15944 -1785 -1289 
Note: N = 1000 for all cases.  M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32.  Clustered error bar mean chart for H3 outcome differences.  
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Hypothesis testing for H3.  Each continuous dependent variable outcome 
difference was associated with the independent categorical variables scenario complexity 
(contested, uncontested) and operational condition (100%, 80%, 60%, 40%).  The 
alternative hypotheses for H3 are that as the Blue centralized node becomes increasingly 
degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreases monotonically, in both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios: 
H3:    µCD11 > µCD21 > µCD31 > µCD41   and µCD12 > µCD22 > µCD32 > µCD42    
The corresponding null hypotheses are as the capability of the Blue centralized C2 
node is increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control will be unchanged or increase, in both 
the contested and uncontested scenarios:   
H30:    µCD11 ≤ µCD21 ≤ µCD31 ≤ µCD41 and µCD12 ≤ µCD22 ≤ µCD32 ≤ µCD42    
ANOVA test assumptions.  The experimental structure validated the first three of 
the six ANOVA assumptions; this section addresses the three ANOVA assumptions that 
relied on results from the data.  For the near-normality assumption, Figures C49-C64 at 
Appendix C show the histograms and P-P plots obtained from the outcome difference 
data for H3.  These graphs support the assertion that the requirement for near normality 
was met.  The uncontested outcome difference distributions met the requirements of the 
Shapiro-Wilk's normality test (p > .05).  The contested outcome distributions tested as 
significant under Shapiro-Wilk (p < .001).  Shapiro-Wilk can produce significant results 
with small deviations from normality (Field, 2009, p. 144); cross-checking with the 
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histograms and P-P plots at Figures C57-C64 did not reveal non-normalities worthy of 
concern. 
For assessing the presence of outliers, Figure 33 displays the clustered boxplots 
for the H3 data.  While there are some data points that exceeded 1.5 box lengths from the 
edge of their box (indicated by circular dots, along with their respective JAEX run 
number), there were no three-box-length extreme outliers, which would have been 
indicted by an asterisk.   
 
 
 
Figure 33.  Clustered boxplot chart of H3 outcome differences. 
 
 
The H3 data violated the requirement for homogeneity of variance for the two-
way ANOVA as assessed by Levene’s test, p < .001 and Hartley’s Fmax = 10.2.  The 
uncontested and contested interaction profile plots for at Figure 34 are ordinal; as per the 
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rationale provided in the H1 discussion, the analysis proceeded using two one-way 
ANOVAs, one for uncontested and another for contested scenarios, using α = .025 for 
each test.  
 
 
Figure 34.  Profile Plots for H3. 
 
Uncontested scenario ANOVA.  The data exhibited compliance with the 
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the uncontested scenario complexity 
levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.0.  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome 
difference was found to be statistically significant for different levels of operational 
condition,  F(3, 3996) = 8766, p < .001, η2 = .868.  The observed power of the test was 
greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all pairwise comparisons were 
statistically significant, p < .001.  Details regarding the post-hoc analysis are provided in 
Table 22. 
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Table 22 
H3 Uncontested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
100% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
3539 
7243 
10857 
.000 
.000 
.000 
3340 
7043 
10657 
3738 
7442 
11056 
80% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-3539 
3704 
7318 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-3738 
3504 
7118 
-3340 
3903 
7517 
60% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-7243 
-3704 
3614 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-7442 
-3903 
3415 
-7043 
-3504 
3813 
40% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-10857 
-3539 
-3614 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-11056 
-7517 
-3813 
-10657 
-7118 
-3415 
      
Note: Std Error = 70.7 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
Contested scenario ANOVA.  The data exhibited compliance with the 
requirement for homogeneity of variances within the contested scenario complexity 
levels, as assessed by the Hartley Fmax value of 1.5.  Per the ANOVA, the mean outcome 
difference was found to be statistically significant for different levels of operational 
condition under the contested scenario,  F(3, 3996) = 1156, p < .001, η2 = .465.  The 
observed power of the test was greater than .99.  Tukey post-hoc analysis revealed that all 
pairwise comparisons were statistically significant, p < .001.  Details regarding the post-
hoc analysis are provided in Table 23. 
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Table 23 
H3 Contested Tukey Post-Hoc Comparisons 
Operational 
Condition 
Operational 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig 
97.5% CI  
lower 
bound 
97.5% CI  
upper 
bound 
100% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
4367 
8124 
11579 
.000 
.000 
.000 
3784 
7540 
10996 
4951 
8707 
12163 
80% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-4367 
3756 
7212 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-4951 
3173 
6629 
-3784 
4340 
7796 
60% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-8124 
-3756 
3456 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-8707 
-4340 
2872 
-7540 
-3173 
4039 
40% 
80%  
60% 
40% 
-11579 
-7212 
-3456 
.000 
.000 
.000 
-12163 
-7796 
-4039 
-10996 
-6629 
-2872 
      
Note: Std Error = 207.0 for all cases.  Sig = Significance; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
H3 summary.  The null hypotheses for both the uncontested and contested 
scenarios under H3 were rejected; the alternative hypotheses were therefore supported.  
Thus, it can be asserted that the mean outcome difference between centralized and 
decentralized control decreased significantly as the Blue centralized node was degraded. 
Summary of Results 
 The purpose of this research effort is to quantitatively assess the impacts of 
decentralizing the command and control of airpower under varying operational 
conditions.  More specifically, the research assesses the impacts that varying particular 
operational conditions have on the mean difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control.   
 For the first operational condition considered, as the proportion of range-limited 
Blue aircraft was increased, or, equivalently, the geographic separation between the 
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sectors was increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller, as hypothesized.  This effect 
held for both the uncontested and contested scenarios.   
 The second set of hypotheses was divided into two subparts.  For the first subpart, 
as hypothesized, as the number of Blue aircraft was increased, the mean difference 
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control 
became smaller.  This effect held for both the uncontested and contested scenarios.  For 
the second subpart, as hypothesized, in the uncontested scenario, as the capability of Blue 
aircraft was increased, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller.  However, for the contested 
scenario, the mean outcome differences did not decrease monotonically as the capability 
of the Blue assets increased.  A revised hypothesis was introduced, in which the mean 
outcome differences were converted to the percentage advantage of centralized versus 
decentralized control.  Testing this revised hypothesis demonstrated that normalized 
mean outcome differences did become significantly smaller monotonically as the Blue 
aircraft capability increased. 
 For the final set of hypotheses, as the Blue’s centralized node became 
increasingly degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control 
and outcomes under decentralized control became smaller.  At approximately 50% 
capacity, the mean outcome difference became negative, indicating that airpower being 
orchestrated by the reduced capacity centralized node had worse outcomes than 
operations under decentralized control.  This effect held for both the uncontested and 
contested scenarios.   
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 The implications of this research for the command and control of airpower will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  Chapter V also presents a more robust discussion of the 
differences observed between the uncontested and contested scenario distributions and 
will amplify the discussion of normalizing outcome differences.    
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
 
     George Box (Champkin, 2013, p. 1) 
 
 
This research used data generated by the airpower combat model JAEX to explore 
the effect of varying specific operational conditions on the mean difference between 
outcomes conducted under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.  
As Box argues in this chapter’s epigraph, no model can claim complete accuracy in 
replicating or predicting reality; yet models can still provide useful insights into 
challenging problems.  This chapter will discuss how the research can expand the body of 
knowledge in the methodological and military command and control arenas, after 
providing an analysis of the results of the hypothesis testing. 
Discussion of Hypotheses Results 
The results of the study showed that, under the given conditions, the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control of airpower was significantly affected by operational conditions.  For this study, 
in each of the baseline conditions, the mean centralized control outcomes indicated an 
advantage over the mean decentralized control outcomes.  The magnitude of this 
advantage decreased as the operational condition was varied from the baseline condition.  
In the course of gathering and analyzing the data, three key issues merited additional 
discussion. 
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First, the initial experimental design included a plan for two-way ANOVA to 
demonstrate some robustness of the theory under scenarios of differing complexity.  De 
Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012, p. 750-751) provide an illustrative example of an 
application of two-way ANOVA using the game of darts.  In their example, the accuracy 
of the dart thrown is a factor of two independent categorical variables, the distance the 
thrower stands from the board and which hand is used to throw the dart.  The dependent 
variable, accuracy, is the miss distance from the target bullseye.  The illustrative example 
includes an analysis of the effects of the levels of each independent variable, and any 
interactions between the two variables.   
However, there was a key difference between this research and the dart board 
experiment described by De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock (2012).  In the dart board 
example, the accuracy was measured the same regardless of the distance the thrower is 
standing from the dart board or which hand the thrower uses to launch the dart.  In the 
present research, the JAEX uncontested scenario employed a different mixture of assets 
from the uncontested scenario, resulting in not just different outcome differences but 
significantly different variances of the distributions; in all cases the data violated the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances required for a two-way ANOVA, requiring an 
alternative analysis methodology.  The inability to directly compare the uncontested and 
contested scenario outcomes using two-way ANOVA statistical techniques became 
obvious only in retrospect.  The additional Red assets and the attrition they imposed on 
Blue in the contested scenarios significantly changed not only the mean difference 
between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control, 
but also their variances.  The inability to use the planned two-way ANOVA to show 
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statistical significance of the trends in the mean outcome differences under both scenario 
complexities turned out to be an inconvenience rather than a significant concern, since all 
the experimental results, after being normalized, supported the alternative hypotheses. 
A second insight, which follows directly from the first, was the need to normalize 
the H2b data in order to reject the null hypothesis in the contested scenario.  A natural 
question that arises is whether normalized data would have supported the other 
hypotheses.  Among several possible approaches to normalizing the outcome differences, 
this research proceeded by re-expressing the dependent variable as the ratio of the 
outcome difference and the overall mean outcome, expressed as a percentage.  The 
normalization results were expressed as the mean centralized control’s outcome 
percentage advantage (or disadvantage) over the mean decentralized control’s outcome. 
The discussions of each operational condition below include a graphical assessment of 
each of the hypotheses using normalized data to demonstrate that the normalization 
technique has general applicability, rather than being an artifact of the H2b conditions.   
Third, it is important to note that each hypothesis considered in this research has 
an implied inverse hypothesis.  Although the experiments in this research adjusted the 
operational conditions in a direction that reduced the mean difference between outcomes 
under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control, reversing the 
direction of the operational condition adjustments would have increased the mean 
difference in outcomes under the two types of control.  These inverse hypotheses are of 
particular applicability in real-world situations.  For example, under the conditions of 
H2a, the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes 
under decentralized control decreased as the number of assets increased.  The data 
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supports a conclusion that the inverse is also true: as assets became scarcer, the advantage 
of centralized control over decentralized control became more pronounced.  The finite 
availability of airpower matched with large requirements generally result in airpower 
being in short supply; airpower advocates have often argued that the scarcity of airpower 
is a key rationale for centralized control (Momyer, 1975).  The experimental data 
confirmed that as Blue inventories were reduced, centralized control became more 
valuable.  Similar results were obtained from inverse hypotheses regarding an increase in 
the percentage of Blue assets with long range reductions in the capability of Blue aircraft 
and increases in the resiliency of the centralized C2 node.  The sections on each 
operational condition below include a discussion of the dual interpretation of results. 
Hypothesis 1: Range limitations on Blue aircraft.  The null hypotheses for both 
the uncontested and contested scenarios were rejected, leading to acceptance of the 
alternative hypotheses.  For model runs that increased the proportion of range-limited 
Blue aircraft, or, equivalently increased the geographic separation between the sectors, 
the mean difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under 
decentralized control became smaller.   
Impact of normalizing the data.  Figures 35 and 36 compare boxplots and 
estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences, 
both of which support the alternative hypotheses.  For the near condition, centralized 
control yielded an approximate 20% advantage over decentralized control in the 
uncontested scenario and 40% advantage in the contested scenario.  These advantages 
dropped monotonically to near zero for both scenario complexities in the far scenario.   
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Figure 35.  Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized 
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 1. 
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Figure 36.  Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and 
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 1.   
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Implications of dual interpretations of the data.  The inverse of H1, also 
supported by the results, shows that the closer two operating areas are to each other, the 
greater the advantage provided by centralized control.  This is equivalent to asserting that 
the higher the proportion of Blue air assets that can range the entire Red target set, the 
greater the advantage provided by centralized control.  The ability to range the entire 
target set could be a function of geographic proximity or due to extended range of 
attacking aircraft.  If a low percentage of assets can range the entire target set, centralized 
control provides little advantage over decentralized control.  The results indicated that, 
under the modeled conditions, centralized control yielded a 20% advantage over 
decentralized control when all Blue air assets could reach all Red targets in the 
uncontested scenario; this advantage was 40% in the contested scenario.  A practical 
application includes use of air refueling to extend the range of aircraft; operating under 
centralized control better takes advantage of the ability to reach high-priority Red targets 
than under decentralized control. 
Hypothesis 2a: Increased number of Blue aircraft.  For both the uncontested 
and contested scenarios, the null hypotheses were rejected, leading to acceptance of the 
alternative hypotheses.  As the number of Blue aircraft was increased, the mean 
difference between outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized 
control became monotonically smaller.   
Impact of normalizing the data.  The non-normalized outcome differences 
supported the alternative hypotheses.  Figures 37 and 38 compare boxplots and estimated 
marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences.  Both 
figures show close alignment between the non-normalized mean outcome difference and 
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the normalized outcome difference.  Centralized control yielded an approximate 50% 
advantage over decentralized control in the 1.0 condition in the uncontested scenario, and 
60% advantage in the contested scenario; these advantages dropped to near zero when 
Blue assets were doubled for both scenario complexities.  A possible explanation for this 
effect lies in the capability of a large inventory to effectively achieve effects against 
targets in its respective sector without needing the concentration of effort that 
centralization provides. 
Implications of dual interpretations of the data.  The inverse of H2a, also 
supported by the results, shows that as Blue assets become scarcer, the greater the 
advantage provided by centralized control.  The results indicate that, under the modeled 
conditions, as available Blue assets were reduced by half, then centralized control yielded 
a 50% advantage over decentralized control in the uncontested scenario, and 60% 
advantage in the contested scenario.  Practical applications can reflect attrition of assets, 
redeployment of forces to handle another contingency, or the reality that some proportion 
of Blue air assets are one-time-use, such as cruise missiles which, after being expended, 
are no longer available for subsequent use.  As the Blue inventory is drawn down, 
centralized control enables a more optimum use of remaining assets. 
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Figure 37.  Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized 
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2a. 
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Figure 38.  Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and 
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2a.  
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Hypothesis 2b: Increased capability of Blue aircraft.  For the uncontested 
scenario, the null hypothesis was rejected.  For the contested scenario, however, in 
contradiction to the alternative hypothesis, the mean absolute outcome difference did not 
decrease monotonically as the capability of the Blue assets increased.  Specifically, 
setting the Blue capability at the midrange value of Quality C in the contested scenario 
produced an increase in the mean outcome difference, as was shown graphically in Figure 
28.   
Impact of normalizing the data.  Figures 39 and 40 compare boxplots and 
estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences and normalized differences.  
The re-expressed, normalized data supported the alternative hypotheses that the mean 
outcome difference decreased monotonically as the capability of the Blue assets 
increased for both the uncontested and contested scenarios.  With Blue assets assigned 
quality E, centralized control yielded an approximate 50% advantage over decentralized 
control when uncontested, and 100% advantage in the contested scenario; these 
advantages were reduced to near zero when Blue assets were at quality A, the model’s 
highest level.   
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Figure 39.  Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized 
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2b. 
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Figure 40.  Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and 
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 2b.   
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Implications of dual interpretations of the data.  The inverse of H2b shows that 
as Blue is equipped with less-capable assets, the advantage provided by centralized 
control increases.  Starting from Blue Quality A, in which there is near-zero advantage in 
centralized control, as the Blue asset quality was degraded to Quality E, centralized 
control yielded an approximate 50% advantage over decentralized control when 
uncontested and 100% advantage in the contested scenario.  Similar to the results of H2a 
with reduced quantity, for assets of much lower quality there is less slack in the system, 
and centralized control is better able to ensure best use of the reduced-quality assets.  A 
practical application can reflect deployment of high-quality aircraft to another region, or 
long-term attrition of top-quality airframes and well-trained crews during a protracted 
conflict, as was the case for the air forces of both Germany and Japan during WWII 
(Overy, 1980, p. 144).   
Hypothesis 3: Degradation of Blue centralized control capability.  For both 
the uncontested and contested scenarios, the null hypotheses were rejected, leading to 
acceptance of the alternative hypotheses.  As the Blue centralized node’s capability to 
execute the C2 function became degraded, the mean difference between outcomes under 
centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control became significantly 
smaller.  Below approximately 50% capacity, the centralized node produced worse mean 
outcomes than operations under decentralized control, under both uncontested and 
contested scenarios.   
Impact of normalizing the data.  Both the absolute and normalized outcome 
difference data supported the alternative hypotheses that as the centralized node becomes 
degraded, the advantage of centralized control diminishes.  There is reasonably close 
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alignment between the absolute and normalized boxplots and estimated marginal means, 
as seen in Figures 41 and 42.  A unique aspect of the H3 operational condition was that 
the centralized node degraded to a point beyond which it operated at a disadvantage to 
decentralized control.  For the modeled conditions, the breakeven point was in the 50% 
range, below which the centralized node was outperformed by the decentralized nodes.  
When fully capable, centralized control exhibited an approximate 40% advantage over 
decentralized in the uncontested scenario and 80% in the contested scenario.  When the 
Blue C2 node was reduced to 40% capacity, centralized control yielded an approximate 
20% disadvantage under both the uncontested and contested scenarios.   
Implications of dual interpretations of the data.  The inverse of H3 shows that as 
the Blue centralized C2 node becomes more capable, the greater its advantage over 
decentralized control, all other things being equal.  The results supported the hypothesis 
that a centralized node operating at 100% will have a greater advantage over 
decentralized control than a degraded centralized C2 node.  In this experiment, a poorly 
functioning centralized C2 node operated at a disadvantage compared to the decentralized 
nodes.  When fully functional, the centralized C2 node yielded an approximate 40% 
advantage in centralized control over decentralized in the uncontested scenario and 80% 
advantage in the contested scenario.  A practical application can reflect a disorganized 
start with a dysfunctional command structure; as the centralized node builds its 
capability, it will begin to outperform the disparate efforts of the decentralized nodes.  
The allied experience in North Africa in WWII, as discussed in Chapter II, reflects such a 
disorganized start, with subsequent alterations that emphasized a more centralized C2 
structure. 
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Figure 41.  Comparison of clustered boxplot charts for absolute (top) and normalized 
(bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 3. 
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Figure 42.  Comparison of estimated marginal means charts for absolute (top) and 
normalized (bottom) outcome differences under Hypothesis 3. 
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Conclusions  
The normalized results of this study supported the three basic hypotheses posed in 
Chapter I.  The results were consistent across notional uncontested and contested 
scenarios, demonstrating a level of robustness of the research and providing some 
assurance that the results were not an artifact of the experiment’s structure or 
serendipitous initial conditions.  Beyond the statistical significance of the outcomes, the 
graphical representations of the results show useful trends in the mean difference between 
outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.  This study 
has several areas of theoretical and practical application that add to the body of 
knowledge regarding command and control of airpower, as discussed below. 
Generalizations: Theoretical contributions.  The first theoretical contribution 
of the study concerns the calculation of the dependent variable in the study, the difference 
in JAEX outcomes under centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control.  
Appendix B describes how combining data from two normal distributions through 
addition or subtraction produces normally distributed data.  This property was used to 
enable parametric statistical analyses to examine the output of two systems that produce 
near-normally distributed data by combining them into a single, near-normally distributed 
data set.  This study appears to be original in applying this property to the analysis of the 
modeled outcomes.  The framework developed for this study could be used for future 
experiments in which normally distributed outcomes are generated by simulations.   
A second generalization concerns the nonlinearities encountered in the contested 
scenario of H2b.  This unanticipated outcome served as a reminder that warfare itself is 
chaotic and nonlinear, as was asserted by Clausewitz (1976 translation).  This result also 
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is a case where results that are contrary to expectations can add to the body of 
knowledge.  As it happened, the nonlinearities in H2b brought to light the unanticipated 
need to normalize the data in order to achieve alignment with the hypotheses.  These 
normalized results, expressed as centralized control’s mean percentage advantage or 
disadvantage over decentralized control, provided a more intuitive picture of the impacts 
than expressing the results as absolute JAEX numerical outcomes. 
Finally, the methodology used in this study can be generalized beyond the realm 
of military command and control; the framework can be used for sensitivity analysis for 
decentralization options in business or governmental structures in which there are 
pressures to centralize or decentralize activities or production capabilities.  The 
methodology requires that the centralized and decentralized system outputs can be 
stochastically modeled.  Possible non-military applications include assessing centralized 
management and decentralization of some production activities in a business (Haas, Riis, 
& Hvolby, 1998; Morgan, 1997) or balancing centralization and decentralization of 
police operations (Kurtz, 1995). 
Generalizations: Practical contributions.  This study’s results support several 
practical generalizations regarding decentralization of airpower C2 for consideration by 
practitioners in the field: 
 Centralized control’s initial advantage in using Blue aircraft to attack the 
highest-priority Red targets is significantly reduced as the proportion of Blue 
aircraft that can reach targets outside their assigned sector is reduced.  In this, 
the first experiment, a Blue force with a high percentage of longer-range 
assets exhibited an advantage, ranging from 20% to 40% depending on 
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scenario complexity, when centrally controlled.  As the proportion of short-
range assets increased, the advantage was monotonically reduced to nil.  Thus, 
a Blue force consisting of short-range assets can be effectively managed in a 
decentralized manner, but a force with significant long-range capability is 
more effective when centrally controlled. 
 The initial advantage provided by centralized control in managing scarce or 
lower-capability assets is significantly reduced as each Blue sector is provided 
larger numbers or higher-quality assets to prosecute targets in its own 
assigned Red sector.  In the second experiment, the initial Blue centralized C2 
advantage, ranging from 50% to 60% depending on scenario complexity, 
monotonically dropped to nil as the Blue inventory was doubled.  For the 
experiment in which Blue asset capability was increased, the initial Blue 
centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to 110% depending on scenario 
complexity, dropped to nil when the modeled capability of Blue aircraft was 
increased from low to high quality.  Thus, the advantage provided by 
centralized control in managing scarce or lower-capability assets was negated 
when each Blue sector was provided assets of sufficient quantity or quality to 
prosecute all targets in its respective Red sector.  The increase in numbers and 
capability must come from other operating areas, so the military and political 
leadership must assess the opportunity cost associated with making each Blue 
decentralized sector self-sufficient. 
 The initial advantage provided by centralized control in managing assets is 
significantly reduced as the centralized node’s capability is degraded.  In the 
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third experiment, the initial centralized C2 advantage, ranging from 50% to 
110% depending on scenario complexity, monotonically dropped to -20% 
(indicating Red advantage) as the Blue C2 was severely degraded.  Thus, the 
severely degraded Blue centralized C2 node generated less effective airpower 
than the combined airpower generated by the Blue decentralized C2 nodes.    
Several insights stem from the unexpected nonlinearity identified in the contested 
scenario of H2b, which would not have been apparent had the experiment examined only 
two levels of the operational condition, or if only the uncontested scenario had been 
modeled.  First, experiments that yield unexpected results can add to the body of 
knowledge of a subject more than those in which the results match expectations.   The 
identification of the cause of the nonlinearity led to development of the normalization 
technique which provided a more intuitive description of the results than did the original 
depiction of the data in absolute terms.  A second insight is that the Blue force with low 
capability levels exhibited only a marginal advantage over its Red adversary, under both 
centralized and decentralized control.  Moderately increasing the Blue capability 
significantly enhanced the Blue advantage over Red.  Finally, the nonlinearity serves as a 
reminder that C2 structures merit continual evaluation as a conflict unfolds.  This need to 
continually evaluate C2 structures has practical implications.  As an example, the theater 
JFACC model instituted in the Central Command region in the early 2000’s enabled one 
air commander to oversee airpower operations across the theater, including airpower 
support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lambeth, 2005).  As the two conflicts 
developed on timelines that significantly exceeded initial expectations, however, a 
tailored, hybrid C2 structure eventually evolved, with some airpower support 
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decentralized to the subordinate joint force commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hukill 
et al., 2012).    
Recommendations 
 
 This section outlines recommendations for airpower C2 practitioners, provides a 
suggestion for expanding on an analysis technique used in this research methodology for 
this study, and proposes areas for future research to extend this study.   
Recommendations for airpower C2 practitioners.  This study adds to the body 
of knowledge upon which commanders rely, augmented by personal experience and 
understanding of the situation, to decide on appropriate airpower C2 arrangements.  
Combined with other assessments, the results of this study can provide input into the 
myriad factors that commanders consider when designing C2 structures.  Such structures 
invariably involve decisions regarding the appropriate levels of centralization and 
decentralization for various assets and mission types.  For example, command and control 
of strategic assets may be highly centralized, while those assets performing close air 
support may be more decentralized (Hinote, 2009). 
 One way to demonstrate and disseminate the insights from this study is through 
professional military education venues.  The study provides a framework for training and 
education of practitioners in the C2 of airpower.  Professional military education’s 
treatment of airpower C2 can include doctrine, historical case studies, and wargames 
against an active Red team to gain practical experience.  This study demonstrates the 
potential for comparing different levels of centralizing command and control in the 
course of conducting these wargames, to provide future practitioners with a working-
level understanding of the pros and cons of decentralizing airpower C2.   
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Recommendations for research methodology.  A potential area for further 
study of research methodology would involve an in-depth analysis of the normalization 
technique developed as an expedient for this study.  In the present study, the normalized 
outcome was computed by expressing the result as a mean percentage of centralized 
control advantage or disadvantage compared to decentralized control.  The resulting 
distribution, obtained by multiplying each data point of normally distributed data by a 
constant, retained the properties of normality (Wolfram, 2018).  Additional research 
could examine the mathematical foundations for various approaches to normalizing the 
data to enable comparisons across different levels of an independent categorical variable.   
Recommendations for future research.  Additional research could investigate 
assertions in Hinote (2009), Betts (2014), or Hukill et al. (2012) that were not addressed 
in this research; summaries of their key variables can be found in Figures 12, 13, and 14.  
For example, Betts surmised that the degree of trust between the C2 headquarters and the 
operational units could influence the centralization-decentralization balance; follow-on 
research could examine decentralization schemes that trade increased trust for the loss in 
efficiency.  This and similar such research could establish corresponding operational 
conditions for evaluation using the methodology in this research effort.   
Future studies can build on the framework established in this study, generating 
additional hypotheses to be tested and pushing the boundaries established by the 
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations in this study.  Researchers analyzing C2 
resiliency schemes could use this framework for assessing relative effectiveness of 
decentralization schemes.  Consider, for example a new hypothesis, labeled Hypothesis 4, 
testing the inverse of H2a, asserting that the mean difference between outcomes under 
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centralized control and outcomes under decentralized control will increase as the number 
of Blue assets decreases in a complex scenario.  This hypothesis asserts that as Blue 
assets become scarcer, centralized control will have an increasing advantage over 
decentralized control.  This hypothesis could be tested using JAEX, expanding the Blue 
and Red air, space, and cyberspace inventories and bases, and modeling a large-scale 
conventional conflict under centralized and decentralized control assumptions.   
As an example, refer to Figure 43, depicting a complex scenario in which both 
Blue and Red forces possess myriad offensive and defensive air, space, and cyberspace 
capabilities.  Under centralized control, airpower is orchestrated from a single Combined 
Air Operations Center.  However, command and control could be forced to devolve 
temporarily to a decentralized, sector-based scheme, as was planned for in NATO’s early 
years for political, technological, and resiliency reasons (Rifenburg, 1989).   
During the Cold War, the Central Region of Europe included four Sector 
Operations Centers and associated Allied Tactical Operations Centers which could 
operate independently for defensive and offensive operations within their assigned 
geographic sectors.  This arrangement was criticized for the challenges created by the 
various C2 agencies involved in prosecuting air operations, yet, as Rifenburg noted at the 
time, “the numbers of C2 facilities certainly make the enemy’s targeting problem more 
complex” (p. 20).   
 
      160 
 
 
Figure 43.  Blue vs. Red Central Europe scenario depicting decentralized target sectors.  
From: John Tiller Software, Inc., used with permission.   
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 4 analyzes the Blue force structure for each of three operational Blue 
asset condition levels: a baseline inventory, 75% inventory, and 50% inventory.  Each 
level was modeled in 1,000 iterations of the JAEX model.  Figure 44 shows the outcome 
difference histograms for the three levels, which are visually verified to be near-normal.  
Figure 45 depicts the estimated marginal means at each level with 95% confidence 
intervals, showing the increase in mean outcome differences as the Blue force structure 
decreases is not monotonical.   
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Figure 44.  Histograms for H4 outcome differences for the three Blue inventory levels. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45.  Estimated marginal means for absolute outcome differences under H4.  Error 
bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for the means. 
 
 
After applying the normalization technique outlined earlier, Figure 46 shows the 
histograms of mean centralized control advantage are near-normal.  Figure 47 shows the 
normalized data support the alternative hypothesis that centralization has an increased 
advantage over decentralization as assets become scarcer.  For the H4 modeled scenario, 
the mean centralized control outcome provided an approximate 13% advantage over 
decentralized control when the number of assets was reduced by half.  However, an 
      162 
 
unexpected finding, and area warranting further analysis, was that the rate of increase in 
the outcome difference when assets were reduced from 1.0 level to 0.75 (0% to 11%) 
tapered off as the assets were cut from 0.75 level to 0.50 level (11% to 13%).  It was 
expected that as assets become scarcer, the slope of the marginal means (Figure 47) 
would increase.   
 
Figure 46.  Histograms for H4 normalized outcome differences for the three Blue 
inventory levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47.  Estimated marginal means for normalized outcome differences under H4.   
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Summary 
Successful scientific research often benefits from a foundation of qualitative 
research in accomplishing quantitative evaluations (Simpson, 2015, p. 193).  The study’s 
results provide quantitative support to assertions regarding decentralization made by 
previous researchers, including Hinote (2009), Hukill et al. (2012), and Betts (2014).   
The methodology used in this research, in which outcomes under centralized 
control were contrasted with outcomes under decentralized control for the same starting 
conditions, provides a framework for further assessments of the impact of decentralizing 
airpower C2.  The study succeeded in quantifying the relationships between C2 structures 
and operational conditions for specified initial conditions.  Future research could use 
different models and assess different operational conditions to gain a deeper 
understanding of the tradeoffs involved in developing resilient, appropriately centralized 
or decentralized approaches to airpower command and control. 
Per joint doctrine, commanders are responsible for designing and implementing 
appropriate C2 structures (Joint Publication 3-30, 2014); this study can provide input into 
the various factors that commanders consider in this process.  For those practitioners 
predisposed to favor centralization, the study shows that there are circumstances in which 
decentralized control can be as effective, or more effective, than centralized control.  For 
those predisposed to favor decentralized control, the study shows there are conditions 
under which centralization provides potentially significant increases in airpower’s overall 
effectiveness.    
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APPENDIX A 
Description of the JAEX Model 
This appendix describes JAEX, the airpower model used as the data generation 
and collection apparatus for this research.  JAEX is a hexagon-based wargaming model.  
Figure A1 displays a notional JAEX screenshot.  Each JAEX hexagon represent 
approximately 50 nautical miles of terrain and airspace.   
 
 
 
Figure A1.  Notional JAEX screenshot. (Tiller, 2017b) 
 
 
Each run of the JAEX model produces a numerical outcome score based on two 
types of attrition: ground assets and air assets.  Each friendly and enemy air and surface 
asset has assigned characteristics maintained in an asset database, as shown in Figure A2.  
Each asset has an assigned value, with high-value assets being assigned a relatively high 
numerical value in the model.  Strikes against ground targets produce scores based on the 
level of damage and the value of the target.  Air attrition produces scores based on the 
value of the asset destroyed.  Each attack has a given probability of success; the overall 
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outcome is computed based on a sum of the attritional outcomes.  Positive outcomes 
indicate Blue advantage, while negative outcomes indicate Red advantage. 
 
Figure A2.  Screenshot of JAEX asset database. 
 
The numerical outcome of each model run constitutes the unit of analysis for this 
research effort.  JAEX is a stochastic model; hence, multiple runs of the model under the 
same conditions will generate a distribution of results.  The results of multiple computer 
runs, aggregated into bins, generate a histogram depicting the distribution of outcomes, 
such as that as shown in Figure A3.  
 
 
Figure A3.  Histogram with Gaussian curve fitting (Tiller, 2017b).  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Difference of Two Normal Distributions 
This research focused on the difference between outcomes under centralized 
control and outcomes under decentralized control.  A relevant mathematical result stems 
from the observation that the difference between two normally distributed random 
variables X and Y, with means and variances (µx, σ2x) and (µy, σ2y), respectively, is given 
by (Weisstein, 2018): 
 
 (1) 
 
 
 
 (2) 
 
 where δ(x) is a delta function, which is normally distributed with mean 
  (3) 
 
 and variance 
 (4) 
 
Thus, the difference between normally distributed centralized and normally 
distributed decentralized C2 outcomes will also be normally distributed, albeit with a 
variance that equals the sum of the two distribution’s variances.  This property enabled 
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statistical comparison of the difference between centralized and decentralized outcomes 
using tests requiring normally distributed populations.    
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APPENDIX C 
Histograms and P-P Plots 
The tests used in this research were parametric, requiring the data to be 
approximately normally distributed (De Veaux, Velleman, & Bock, 2012, p. 129-130).  
This appendix includes the histograms of the centralized – decentralized outcome 
differences computed based on JAEX model runs, with normal distribution plots 
overlaid.  The probability-probability plots (P-P) are also presented, in which the z-scores 
of the data points were plotted against the values that would have been expected for a 
normal distribution (De Veaux, Velleman, & Bock, 2012, p. 129-130; Field, 2009, p. 
147-148; Laerd, 2018).  Near-normality of the data is one assumption required for 
ANOVA tests; the visualizations in this appendix assisted in assessing this condition. 
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Figure C1.  Histogram of H1 uncontested near outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C2.  Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested near outcome difference. 
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Figure C3.  Histogram of H1 Uncontested mid outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
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Figure C4.  Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested mid outcome difference.  
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Figure C5.  Histogram of H1 uncontested far outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
Figure C6.  Normal P-P plot of H1 uncontested far outcome difference. 
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Figure C7.  Histogram of H1 contested near outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C8.  Normal P-P plot of H1 contested near outcome difference. 
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Figure C9.  Histogram of H1 contested near outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C10.  Normal P-P plot of H1 contested mid outcome difference. 
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Figure C11.  Histogram of H1 contested far outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C12.  Normal P-P plot of H1 contested far outcome difference. 
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Figure C13.  Histogram of H2a uncontested 1.0 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C14.  Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 1.0 outcome difference. 
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Figure C15.  Histogram of H2a uncontested 1.5 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C16.  Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 1.5 outcome difference. 
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Figure C17.  Histogram of H2a uncontested 2.0 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C18.  Normal P-P plot of H2a uncontested 2.0 outcome difference. 
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Figure C19.  Histogram of H2a contested 1.0 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C20.  Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 1.0 outcome difference. 
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Figure C21.  Histogram of H2a contested 1.5 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C22.  Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 1.5 outcome difference. 
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Figure C23.  Histogram of H2a contested 2.0 outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C24.  Normal P-P plot of H2a contested 2.0 outcome difference. 
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Figure C25.  Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-E outcome difference data with 
normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C26.  Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference. 
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Figure C27.  Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-C outcome difference data with 
normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C28.  Normal P-P plot of H2b uncontested Quality-C outcome difference. 
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Figure C29.  Histogram of H2b uncontested Quality-A outcome difference data with 
normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C30.  Normal P-P plot of H2b uncontested Quality-A outcome difference. 
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Figure C31.  Histogram of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C32.  Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-E outcome difference. 
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Figure C33.  Histogram of H2b contested Quality-C outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C34.  Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-C outcome difference. 
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Figure C35.  Histogram of H2b contested Quality-A outcome difference data with 
normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C36.  Normal P-P plot of H2b contested Quality-A outcome difference. 
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Figure C37.  Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-E outcome difference 
data with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C38.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-E outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C39.  Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-C outcome difference 
data with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C40.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-C outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C41.  Histogram of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-A outcome difference 
data with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C42.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized uncontested Quality-A outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C43.  Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-E outcome difference data 
with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C44.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-E outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C45.  Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-C outcome difference data 
with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C46.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-C outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C47.  Histogram of H2b normalized contested Quality-A outcome difference data 
with normal distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C48.  Normal P-P plot of H2b normalized contested Quality-A outcome 
difference. 
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Figure C49.  Histogram of H3 uncontested 100% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C50.  Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 100% outcome difference. 
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Figure C51.  Histogram of H3 uncontested 80% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C52.  Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 80% outcome difference. 
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Figure C53.  Histogram of H3 uncontested 60% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C54.  Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 60% outcome difference. 
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Figure C55.  Histogram of H3 uncontested 40% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C56.  Normal P-P plot of H3 uncontested 40% outcome difference. 
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Figure C57.  Histogram of H3 contested 100% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C58.  Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 100% outcome difference. 
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Figure C59.  Histogram of H3 contested 80% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C60.  Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 80% outcome difference. 
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Figure C61.  Histogram of H3 contested 60% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
Figure C62.  Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 60% outcome difference. 
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Figure C63.  Histogram of H3 contested 40% outcome difference data with normal 
distribution plot overlaid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C64.  Normal P-P plot of H3 contested 40% outcome difference. 
 
